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The Human Side of Public-Private
Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation
to Administrative Law Management
Alfred C. Aman, Jr.* & Joseph C. Dugan"
ABSTRACT: During the New Deal era, Congress created a then-
unprecedented program of economic and regulatory reforms, establishing
independent agencies, and empowering them to shape and enforce pragmatic
industrial policies. Twenty-first century regulation looks strikingly different
from the New Deal vision. While New Deal agencies continue to perform some
regulatory functions, market approaches have replaced many traditional
command-and-control formulations, with private entities stepping in to
perform tasks historically reserved to government.
Though government-by-contract is becoming the new normal, neither the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") nor many of its state equivalents
provide adequate guidance to ensure that individual rights are protected and
democratic values preserved during these changing times.
This Article proposes a practical response to the outsourcing revolution: a new
statutory framework derived from the elements of contract and directed toward
public-private partnerships and contemporary delegations. If successful, our
proposal would address the democracy deficit that inheres in the shadowy
outsourcing processes that are common today; it would invite public
stakeholders into the contracting process; and it would establish an essential
safeguard for individual rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the New Deal era, Congress created what was, up to that point,
"the most thoroughgoing program of reform in our history."' Responding to
massive market failures, monopolistic industries badly in need of oversight,'
1. Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 319
(1964). Landis was something of an administrative law "renaissance man," serving in turn as a
member of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), a member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), and, later, as the SEC commissioner. See generally JUsTIN O'BRIEN, THE
TRIUMPH, TRAGEDY AND LOST LEGACY OFJAMES M LANDIS: A LIFE ON FIRE (2014).
2. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 47-48 (1995) ("It was not competition that caused depressions, but
rather the lack of it, the system of private monopolies that created violent inequalities in the
distribution of income and destroyed the purchasing power of the masses.").
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and fledgling industries trying to take hold, Congress enacted a plethora of
new statutes, created independent agencies, and imbued these agencies with
the power to shape and enforce pragmatic industrial policies.s These agencies
represented more than a mere iteration of traditional executive power:
indeed, as one of the primary architects of the New Deal, James Landis,
observed, the administrative process conceived during this era granted
agencies the "full ambit of authority necessary ... in order to plan, to
promote, and to police."4
Times have changed. Many if not most of the monopolistic and fledgling
domestic industries that Landis described over 75 years ago have evolved into
complex, decentralized enterprises, often multinational in scope. Most New
Deal agencies continue to perform some regulatory functions, but market
approaches to regulation have replaced many traditional command-and-
control formulations.5 More important, globalization has embedded itself
into the fabric of contemporary society through channels opened, in large
part, by the neoliberalization of global markets. Technology has greatly
enhanced the free flow of capital around the world.6
Transnational corporations can make private "production, financ [ing],
and investment" decisions relatively free of direct state involvement and move
"from location to location" without entrenching in local politics or exposing
themselves to much local regulation.7
Neoliberalism, with its deregulatory bent and its emphases on free trade
and open markets, has typified the "global era" of administrative law that first
emerged in the i 980s.8 A mainstay of this era has been outright deregulation
wherever possible, or the displacement of traditional governmental
regulation with market approaches where deregulation is not possible. Part
3. SeeJaffe, supra note 1, at 321.
4. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938).
5. The environmental and health-and-safety era of regulation, beginning in the late
sg6os, added another substantial regulatory layer to what had been created in the New Deal.
ALFRED C. AMAN,JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAw REFORM
23-30 (2004).
6. "[T]oday's financial markets are globalizing rather than internationalizing... since, for
instance, the movement of capital has largely become independent of the sovereign control of state
agencies." Jost Delbrack, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A
European Perspective, IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10 (1993); see also David Albrecht, More on the Free
Row of Capital and 1FRS, SuMMA (Mar. 7, 2009), http://profalbrechtwordpress.com/2009/03/07/
more-on-the-free-flow-of-capital-and-ifrs ("Current economic orthodoxy is based on the
internationalization of financial markets and free flow of capital across any and all national borders.").
7. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:
Globalization, Democracy and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, 6 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
397,408 (1999)-
8. Id. at 400 ("Deregulation and privatization [have been] widespread responses to the
global economy throughout the West. On some occasions, deregulation in the United States
involved the wholesale substitution of the market for regulation .... In other instances,
deregulation involved the use of the market as a regulatory tool . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
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and parcel of this transition has been a dramatic expansion of outsourcing
and public-private partnerships. Agencies form contracts with private parties;
they specify terms at the outset, and they maintain degrees of supervisory
authority. As a practical matter, however, it is the private contractors who
deliver many of the services traditionally reserved to government.
To be sure, outsourcing is not a novel phenomenon. It is only natural
that private contractors are well-suited to perform certain tasks-e.g., build
roads, repair bridges, collect trash, and remove snow.9 We have, however,
been witnessing not only a shift in the overall quantity of government
contracts generally but also substantial qualitative differences in the kinds of
governmental activities and responsibilities governments at all levels-
federal, state, and local-are willing to turn over to private providers."o
Contractors now manage immigration detention centers and private prisons;
they disburse welfare benefits and operate utilities; they secure communities
and investigate crimes." They have formed corporate entities to manage
charter schools, augmenting traditional public education with a cost-
competitive public-private hybrid. They have even been extensively involved
in crucial aspects of military operations (including, though certainly not
limited to, so-called "black ops").'s
9. For a helpful discussion on the history of outsourcing, particularly at the municipal level, see
Cristiane Carvalho Keetch, Trends in the Contracting Out of Local Government Sevices, UNIV. S. FLA.
SCHOLAR COMMONS: GRADUATE THESES & DISSERTATIONS, Jan. 2013, at 39-47, http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl-5902&Context=etd. Indianapolis, Indiana (a
city near and dear to the hearts of these authors), is particularly famous for its early---and
comprehensive-approach to municipal privatization. See Eric Schnurer, When Government Gnnpetes
Against the Private Sector Everybody Wins, ATLANC (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.theadantic.com/politics/
archive/2o 5 /o 3 /when-government-competes-against-the-privatesector-everybody-wins/3874
6 0.
1o. As Professor Aman notes in a recent essay on the legal aspects of globalization:
[A] primary area in which law is involved in globalization is in the administrative
transfer of state functions to markets. "Privatization," "downsizing," "outsourcing,"
"contracting out," and other forms of marketization are properly considered among
the dynamics of globalization, once these are understood in context... . Indeed, the
use of the private sector to deliver what once were governmentally provided services
is a common form of privatization. Private contractors are pervasively involved in
government functions, from military support to social services and myriad other
roles. The primary governance tool in these cases is the contract.
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization: Legal Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
& BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 254, 258 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Some commentators have questioned whether a profit motive is compatible with K-12
education. See, e.g., Amy Baral, Charter Schools' Darker Side, SALON (July 6, 2012, 9:21 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/0 7 /o6/charterschools_darkersidesalpart; Alan Singer, Why
HedgeFunds Love Charter Schools, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-
singer/why-hedge-funds-love-char b-53574 86.html-funds-love-charter-schools (last updatedJuly
20, 2014); cf Erik Kain, 8o% ofMichigan Charter Schools Are For-Profits, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2011,
11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/o9/2 9 /8<-of-michigan-charter-school
s-are-for-profits.
13. See infra notes 152-57.
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Though government-by-contract has increasingly become the new
normal in a variety of contexts, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
Congress's basic roadmap for rulemaking and adjudication in the
administrative state,'4 remains troublingly detached from these ubiquitous
partnerships.'s Similarly detached are many of the "mini-APAs" and other
procedural statutes crafted by state legislatures to control state agency
practice. Often, these laws-enacted as they were in a period in which
agencies wielded more centralized authority-offer little formal guidance
with respect to contracting.'5 The federal APA itself expressly exempts matters
relating "to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" from the
guidelines of notice-and-comment rulemaking.'7 For state and federal agents
contemplating, inter alia, private prisons or privately administered welfare
systems, these laws offer few parameters: far from ensuring accountability and
due process, they may be viewed by some as a carte blanche to contract, even
where contracting implicates significant human rights concerns.' 8
This Article proposes a practical response to this migration toward
contract: a new kind of statutory framework directed toward public-private
partnerships and contemporary delegations. Our framework would not
necessarily replace or subsume existing law, but it would complement and fill
critical gaps in the APA and state administrative-procedure laws. The goal
14. Few statutory regimes have had a greater effect on the development of the law than the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). In a recent article, Kathryn Kovacs argued that the APA
should qualify as a superstatute within the meaning of Bill Eskridge andJohn Ferejohn's theory:
it emerged from a long period of deliberation; it altered regulatory baselines; it passed the test of
time; and it broadly impacted the law, beyond the four corners of the statute itself. See generally
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015).
15. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court may have a limited appetite for outsourcing, at
least at the extremes. Many commentators speculated that the Court might reject a rulemaking
delegation to Amtrak in a 2015 case, see Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-Delegation
Doctrine Returns After Long Hiatus, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:oo PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2o4/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegation-doctrine-retumrns-after-long-hiatus. The Court
ultimately resolved that case on less controversial grounds, ruling that Amtrak is a governmental entity
for purposes relevant to the rulemaking at issue. See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. RR-s., 135 S. Ct.
1225, 1228 (2015).
16. By contrast, some states have enacted statutes that specifically deal with privatization,
although the constraints that these statutes place on agencies and the protections they carve out
for stakeholders vary widely. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in
Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
261, 272-83 (JUody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2oog) (cataloging various state statutory
schemes); see also infra notes 220-32 and accompanying text (discussing the statutes).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2) (2012). Some states have mini-APAs that closely mirror the federal
language. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21-5-2-5(1) (2014) ("This article does not apply to the
following agency actions ... [t]he acquisition, leasing, or disposition of property or procurement
of goods or services by contract.").
18. In fact, some mini-APAs go so far as to encourage privatization whenever feasible. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50-501 (2016) ("[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to
encourage the use of private contractors for personal services to achieve increased efficiency in
the delivery of government services .. . .").
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here is not to set back the clock or re-entrench in old solutions: the goal is to
propose the key elements any new statutory approach to these issues should
take; it is, in effect, to begin to codify a model of new governance befitting
new relationships forged between public and private actors.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II explores governance across three
categories of delegations to the private sector-what we term general-service
contracts, human-service contracts, and contracts arguably beyond the scope
of permissible delegation. Part III develops our proposed statutory framework
with respect to three aspects of public-private contracts: formation, terms, and
enforcement. Part IV raises and responds to some countervailing
considerations, while Part V concludes with some thoughts about the future
of public-private partnerships in particular and administrative law more
generally. A brief conclusion follows in Part VI.
I II. CONTRACTS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The idea of delegations from agencies (themselves the recipients of
delegated powers)'9 to the private sector is nothing new.20 Government has
long recognized that some tasks are better suited for private actors, and
agencies have relied on nongovernmental entities for basic services and
procurements since the earliest days of the administrative state.-,
But the public-private partnerships that have emerged over the past 20
years represent a very different kind of outsourcing.22 These contracts imbue
19. RobertJ. Gregory, When a Delegation Is Not a Delegation: Using Legislative Meaning to Define
Statutory Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (199o) ("Congress routinely delegates rulemaking
power to agencies, thereby inviting agencies to act in a legislative capacity and to promulgate
standards when implementing a statutory scheme.").
20. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1369 (2003)
("Privatization is now virtually a national obsession. Hardly any domestic policy issue remains
untouched by disputes over the scope of private participation in government .... Privatization is
also endemic as a matter of administrative practice. Ours is a system in which private actors are
so deeply embedded in governance that 'the boundaries between the public and private sectors'
have become 'pervasive[ly] blurr[ed].'" (alteration in original)).
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2) (exempting contracts from the scope of notice-and-comment
rulemaking). Although the Supreme Court banned delegations of legislative power to private
entities in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the delegations we are describing here
do not involve the type of wholesale abdication that Carter Coal contemplated. Moreover, the
Court has sanctioned a wide array of public-private enterprises over the years, signaling the
limited vitality of Carter Coal. See Metzger, supra note 2o, at 1440 (" [W]hile Carter's constitutional
prohibition on private delegations . . . remains alive in theory, it is all but dead in practice. Almost
all private delegations are upheld. Courts are satisfied by formal provision for government
ratification, however perfunctory.").
22. See infta Part II.B. Professors Aman and Greenhouse discuss the rise of this kind of
outsourcing in a recent article. They describe the active promotion of outsourcing during the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, the acceleration of outsourcing under George W. Bush's
directive that federal agencies must privatize to the maximum extent possible, and the continuing
vitality of outsourcing even in the comparatively pro-regulatory Obama Administration. See
generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Carol J. Greenhouse, Prison Privatization and Inmate Labor in the
Global Economy: Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons, 42 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 355 (2014). It is
[Vol. 102:883888
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for-profit actors with substantial powers traditionally reserved to government:
powers to manage the tasks of incarcerating, punishing, and-theoretically at
least-also helping to rehabilitate criminal offenders; powers that directly
affect the nourishment (or lack thereof) of the poor; and powers to house
the homeless, deliver medical care to prisoners, and execute military
operations.2 3
With the exception of contracts involving inherently governmental
activities,24 we recognize that some of these partnerships may be essential for
effective 21st-century governance.2 5 Therefore, we do not argue that this
transformation is necessarily good or bad. This is not an Article about the
hazards or improprieties of outsourcing.6 Public-private partnerships do not
inherently violate legal or normative principles.
worth noting here that, to whatever extent the Obama Administration placed a hiatus on some
deregulatory or delegation efforts, the incoming Trump Administration will very likely accelerate
such efforts-making our proposals here perhaps even more timely than we had anticipated
when we first conceived this Article. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos & Andrew Tangel, Donald Trump's
Cabinet Selections Signal Deregulation Moves Are Coming, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 8, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-signal-deregulation-moves-are-coming
-1481243oo6.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. Inherently governmental activities, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), are activities "so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance
by government personnel." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-7 6, at A-s (2003), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/ao 7 6/a7 6_incl-techcorr
ection.pdf. For more on this important subject, see infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
25. Given rapidly emerging technologies, evolving social norms and mores, legislative
dysfunction in Washington and many state assemblies, and a lack of consensus as to governmental
priorities other than cost containment, contracting makes perfect sense for contemporary
agencies. Agencies must be nimble, self-aware, quick to adapt, and creative with the resources
they harness and deploy. Contracts, with their ultimate flexibility, facilitate these needs. See
Alexander Cooley, Outsourcing Authority: How Project Contracts Transform Global Governance Networks,
in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 238, 241 (Deborah D. Avant et al. eds., 2010) ("Contracts vary in
their exact scope and terms. Six specific aspects of contracts-cost structure, completeness,
duration, monitoring, performance sanctions, and renewal potential-can all shape the
incentives of contracting organizations."); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The
Limited Role of Generalist Cousts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L REV. 170,176-77
(2013) ("In developing a contractual response to changes in the economic environment, parties will
choose the mechanism by which their innovation will be best adapted to the particulars of their
context ... When markets are thick-in the sense that many actors face similar changes in their
dealings and stand to benefit from concerted responses to them-the affected parties often will
institutionalize their innovative contract forms and terms through collective action.... When markets
are thin and the actors few and scattered, parties facing similar problems cannot rely on collective
action to institutionalize contractual innovation because the necessary scale is not present. In these
circumstances, innovation occurs initially in bilateral relationships."); Gilson et al., supra, at igo-i
("Contracting parties must be able to count on the state's enforcement monopoly if they are
confidently to rely on novel forms of agreement Ideally, generalist courts should respond to
exogenously induced innovations by enforcing the chosen methods of mutual cooperation on terms
consistent with the arrangements themselves.").
26. Frankly, hazards also inhere in the conventional model of public services delivered by public
agencies. For example, a New York Times investigative report recently exposed frequent "[b]rutal attacks
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We do argue, however, that certain public-private arrangements, which
involve important political judgments directly affecting the welfare of human
beings, should be subject to administrative law and to the accountability,
transparency, and opportunities for meaningful participation that come with
it. This is particularly the case with the human-service contracts we discuss
below, because these contracts directly impact vulnerable populations-
prisondrs, the poor, immigrants, and others who lack political power and who
are underrepresented or ignored by most of the processes involved. Typical
outsourcing processes exacerbate the powerlessness of these populations.
These processes seldom allow for direct participation in the fundamental
decision to use private providers in the first place, and they usually exclude
vulnerable human stakeholders from weighing in on the ways these contracts
are created and implemented.
It is also especially important to note that the resort to privatization and
outsourcing in such contexts can easily mask the essentially political decisions
involved. For example, a decision to outsource prisoner healthcare to private
providers does not eliminate the fundamental political decisions involving
just how much tax revenue we are willing to spend on these services. Similarly,
quite apart from wanting programs to be carried out efficiently, how much
wealth should we, as a society, allocate toward provision for the homeless or
for welfare recipients? Too often the significance of such political judgments
is lost in the initial decision to outsource, as if the mere choice to delegate to
a private provider were all that is necessary to make an informed decision.27
Such judgments and the resources applied to them are political questions that
need to be answered by public bodies, openly and directly, with input from
all affected stakeholders, including those most directly affected. As we will
show below, the least-cost-bidding competitions that many procurement
by correction officers on inmates-particularly those with mental health issues." Michael Winerip &
Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in jail, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/1 4 /nyregion/rikers-study-finds-prisoners-injured-by-employees.html.
The report revealed that, during an 1 -month period, "129 inmates suffered 'serious injuries'" at
the hands of Department of Correction staff. Id. The point being: privatization does not uni-
directionally impede rights, and the conventional model does not necessarily protect them. See Michael
Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Correction Commissioner Calls Overhauling Rikers a Long Heavy Lift N.Y.
TIMFs (June 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o 5 /o6/05/nyregion/with-new-conmissioner
-a-slow-turning-in-efforts-to-remake-rikers.htl ("[D]ysfunction is so deeply embedded in the jail
culture that, if [Mayor de Blasio] is serious about turning things around, he would need to work at it
until the very day he leaves office.").
27. As just one example, consider privatized health care in New York City's detention
facilities. While privatization netted some financial savings (at least in the short term), service
delivery problems and a general lack of transparency became endemic-a clear case of
privatization gone awry. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on Government
Social Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York City, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 30, 311-13 (2007).
[VOL. 102:883890
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processes utilize are not adequate for the kinds of decisions inherent in a
putative contract involving, for example, health care for prisoners.28
Moreover, there is no reason to limit outsourcing contract procedures to
a competition based only on cost. The requests for proposals ("RFPs")
involved can also be used to encourage competition among potential
providers for new ideas that might, for example, reduce recidivism rates
among private prisoners, represent substantial improvements in the
education level of prisoners, or undertake creative rehabilitative measures.
In addition, private providers are often exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA").§ Moreover, the policies these private providers
implement are not subject to standard rulemaking processes,so nor does the
due process clause necessarily apply to them unless the state action doctrine
is triggered (a question that generally cannot be resolved without substantial
litigation and concomitant expenditures).3' Even if due process does apply,
the breadth and scope of that doctrine have been substantially curtailed by
courts over the years, especially in prison contexts.3 2
Beyond any constitutional or FOIA issues that may arise, agencies should
be required, as a matter of sound policy, to direct their attention to the
individual rights of the parties who come under their jurisdiction when they
turn to private actors, private incentive structures, or market solutions to carry
out their regulatory obligations-lest such contracts and delegations dilute
these protections. We distinguish between human services and other services
of an impersonal or material nature, so as to avoid the inherent risk that
"efficiency-based" approaches incentivize-i.e., commodifying the very
people who are intended to be beneficiaries of the services. Basic human
needs should not be treated as marginal costs. For example, when prisoners
are transported from one private facility to another, based solely on the least-
28. See infta Part H.B.i.
29. See infra Part III.B. 4 -
30. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), (5) (2012) (defining "rule making" as an "agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule" and further defining "agency" as certain
"authorit[ies] of the Government of the United States"); id. § 553(a) (2) (expressly exempting
"matter [s] relating to ... public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" from the strictures
of APA rulemaking).
31. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) ("As a matter of substantive
constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that 'most
rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments,' . . .
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal
right be fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of 'fair
attribution.' First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible.... Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor." (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978))).
32. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995) (holding that the Due Process Clause
accords no remedy to a prisoner who complained that he was improperly subject to disciplinary
segregation because such discipline is not "atypical and significant hardship").
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cost availability of a particular bed, such decisions may result in the transfer
from one part of the country to another without sufficient regard for where
the prisoner's family may be located, thereby eliminating important support
structures for the individuals involved.33 The more abstract and narrowly cost
conscious these decisions become, the more likely it is that the
incommensurability of the values (in this example, family and profit) will be
ignored in the decision-making processes involved. While fiscal prudence is,
of course, a necessary factor in government decisions, even the most
compelling economic justifications for "going private" do not eliminate the
government's core responsibility for the public interest-security in the broad
sense. Thus, we place a high value on public participation and accountability,
especially when human beings are direct stakeholders (as the object of the
services in question). The processes we recommend would provide a check
on what might otherwise be decision-making processes focused exclusively on
the "bottom line." From this perspective, a contract for provision of prison
health care, for example, should specify a standard of care on par with that of
the free population34-just as a contract for building a bridge assumes a
commitment to durability and safety on par with the industry standard. It is
for such reasons that we seek to differentiate what we shall call human-service
contracts from those focused primarily on brick and mortar, administrative
services. When direct human services are at issue, the people who are the
recipients of those services should be considered stakeholders, or third-party
beneficiaries. Personal dignity and the integrity of the body should be among
the considerations that trigger the closer scrutiny we recommend for human-
service contracts.35
Before we explore what such a framework might include and how it
might operate, we first examine the types of public-private arrangements
agencies routinely establish. We conceptualize agency contracting along a
pyramid: At the base lie general-service contracts and procurements. Higher
up along the pyramid lie the human-service contracts that are the primary
focus of this Article's statutory proposal. At the pinnacle lie those contracts
that may exceed the scope of permissible delegation altogether-either
because they inappropriately transfer inherently governmental power to the
private sector or because they excessivelyjeopardize individual rights.
33. See generally Shymeka L. Hunter, Note, More Than just a Private Affair: Is the Practice of
Incarcerating Alaska Prisoners in Private Out-of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 319
(2000); Holly Kirby, Locked Up and Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers & the Private Prison
Industry, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Nov. 18, 2013), http://grassrootsleadership.org/locked-up-
and-shipped-away; Victoria Law, California Ships Prisoners Out of State To "Reduce" Its Prison
Population, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20405<alifornia-
ships-prisoners-out-of-state-to-reduce-its-prison-population; Aijun Sethi & Holly Kirby, Opinion,
Incarceration Across State Lines, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 12, 2014, 11:oo AM), http://america.
aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/prison-overcrowdingaboonforprivateprisons.html.
34. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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We then turn our attention to our proposed statutory framework,
outlining some recommended requirements for human-service contracts-
those delegations of power traditionally reserved to government, which
directly and substantially impact individual rights of human beings, their
nutrition, medical care, and living conditions. With such contracts, basic
dignity of the person and the fundamental integrity of the body are at stake.
A. GENERAL-SERVICE CONTRACTS AND PROCUREMENTS
At the base of our pyramid lie traditional procurement contracts and
similar agreements between agencies and private actors, such as contracts for
the maintenance of facilities, the development of infrastructure, the
deployment of logistics, and the acquisition of equipment. These contracts
enable government to function, and they free up some agencies to focus on
rulemaking, adjudication, and other regulatory activities that legislatures have
charged them to perform.
Procurement contracts represent a substantial percentage of the federal
government's annual outlay.3 6 In fiscal year 2007, for instance, federal
agencies spent nearly $460 billion on procurements.37 The Department of
Defense ("DoD") is responsible for most of these procurements: it spent over
$330 billion on procurements in 2007.38 By comparison, the Department of
Health and Human Services spent nearly $14 billion,ss the Department of
Education and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") each spent less
than $1.5 billion,4o and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
spent around $54 million.41 In 2013, the top federal contractors were all well-
known corporate names: Lockheed Martin, with over g% of the procurement
36. For federal-law purposes, procurement, also called acquisition, is defined in 48 C.F.R.
§ 2.101 (b) (2) (2016):
Acquisition means the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or
services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government
through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence
or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at
the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of
requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of
contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and
those technical and management functions directly related to the process of
fulfilling agency needs by contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. FED. PROCUREMENT DATA Sys.-NExT GENERATION, GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT REPORT: FY 200 7 , at 1 (2007), https://www.fpds.gov/downloads/FPRReports/
Fiscal%2oYearo202oo7/Agencyo2oViews.pdf.
38. Id. at 54.
39. Id. at i 18.
40. Id. at 6o, 71.
41. Id. at 77.
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budget; Boeing, with 4.6%; and Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrup
Grumman, each with contracts worth billions.42
Many of these governmental procurements are relatively uncontroversial.
For instance, no one would seriously challenge an agency's authority to strike
a deal with an outside vendor for onsite food services.43 But even where the
contract's subject matter is straightforward, the need for accountability and
public participation is an entirely different matter from the discretion of
agencies to contract with private providers in the first place. There is always a
need to ensure that the processes by which contractors are chosen are fair and
not susceptible to corruption. The massive outlays at the DoD and other large
agencies may trigger suspicion, particularly where the contracts are formed
without competitive bidding. Moreover, for any contract, irrespective of
subject matter, the cost may be substantial enough to warrant greater public
participation (or at least a greater effort on the part of contracting agencies
to publicize contract terms).44 Further, troubling questions arise as
privatization takes on new forms in new contexts. For instance, the recent
privatization of many municipal utility providers may raise concerns over
42. FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYs.-NEXT GENERATION, GEN. SERvs. ADMIN, TOP 100
CONTRACTORS REPORT (2013), https://www.fpds.gov/downloads/top_requests/TopiooCo
ntractorsReportFiscalYear 2013.xlS.
43. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 887-89 (1961)
(cafeteria employee filed suit after forfeiting her badge to enter M&M Restaurants, Inc., an
establishment located on site at the Naval Gun Factory and operating under contract).
44. This is particularly so in light of current economic trajectories. The U.S. federal budget is
illustrative: assuming that an increase in the individual or corporate income tax rates remains politically
untenable, and assuming-optimistically--that no major crises such as the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan or the Great Recession of 2oo8 further deplete the government's coffers, the public debt
is on track to equal loo% of GDP by 2038. Lisa Mascaro, FederalDeficit Shrinking, But Long-Term Outlook
Dim, LA TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/1 7 /news/la-pn-federal-
deficit-shrinking-outlook-dim-20130917. A recent CBO report noted that, while annual deficits are
likely to hover between 2-5% and 3% of GDP through 2018, they will climb to around 4% in the years
following, particularly if interest rates rise in the latter part of this decade (raising the government's
borrowing costs). CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2014 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 7-8 (2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 51 3 th-congress-2013-2014/reports/4547 i-Long-Term
BudgetOutlook_7-2g.pdf. Medicare and Social Security trust funds, though often used as instruments
of political fear-mongering, are also in actual long-term jeopardy. Under current projections, the
Medicare fund will be depleted in 2026, while the Social Security fund will run out in 2033. Medicare
Will Be Exhausted in 2026, Social Security in 2033, CNBC (May 31, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.
com/id/100780248#. Many states are in similarly precarious positions. See ro States with Enormous Debt
Problems: Repor, HUFFINGTON POsT: Bus., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/state-debt-
report-n_1836603.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2012) (as stated by Bob Williams, President of State
Budget Solutions, "[o]ur states are in trouble and no amount of budget gimmicks, political posturing
or hiding bills will fix the massive debt that they face ... Drastic reforms, innovations and political
courage are needed to put our states back on the road to fiscal survival"). All this to say: when the
government faces perennial shortfalls and the burden of long-term, accelerating debt, the public may
have the right and the responsibility to weigh in on multibillion dollar acquisitions, particularly when
thejustification for those acquisitions seems thin. See David Axe, Pentagon's BigBudgetF-3 5 Fighter 'Can't
Turn, Can't Climb, Can't Run', REUTERS: GREAT DEBATE (July 14, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/
great-debate/2014/07/14/pentagons-big-budget-f-35-fighter-cant-turn-cant-climb ant-run.
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affordable public access to essential services.45 The transition from publicly
administered highways to privately operated toll roads may also trigger
concern, especially if the funds generated from tolls do not result in improved
infrastructure (e.g., fewer potholes and additional lanes of traffic).46
In addition to those contracts with a potentially adverse impact on
consumer access and affordability, some procurement contracts may
implicate democracy concerns. Jennifer Nou, for example, has addressed the
privatization of ballot counting, describing a "hybrid regime featur[ing]
thousands of decentralized bureaucracies and a select group of private
vendors that produce the equipment and requisite software to count millions
of ballots."47 Though Nou recognized the importance of technological
innovation, she criticized a system characterized by a "lack of centralized
coordination" and "little sense of shared best practices."4 8
General-service contracts can raise concerns, and these concerns warrant
consideration. But for the most part, for the purposes of this Article, we leave
these contracts to the expertise of agencies charged with carrying out their
legislative directives.49 We turn our primary attention instead to those
45. See, e.g., Mike Gorrell, Eagle Mountain to Sell Its Gas, Electric Utilities, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 4,
2014, 4:15 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/money/58026 7 89yg/gas-electric-
eagle-mountain.html.csp; Danielle Ivory et al., In American Towns, Private Profits fom Public Works, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/12/2 4 /business/dealbook/private-equity-
water.html; Thom Nickels, A New hban Crime: Selling Public Utilities to Private Corporations, HUFFINGTON
POST: BLOC, http://www.huffingtonposLcom/thom-nickels/a-new-urban-crime b_4 97g837.html(last updated May 21, 2014).
46. The Future of Toll Roads in the US., NPR DIANE REHM SHOW (Oct. 22, 2014, o:oo AM),
http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2014-10-22/future-toll-roads-us/transcript (discussing "how
best to pay for highways and the future of toll roads"); see also Darwin Bondgraham, Highway Robbery:
How 'Public-Private Partnerships" Etract Private Profit from Public Infrastructure PrVjects, DOLLARS & SENSE
(2012), http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2012/1112bondgraham.html (discussing the
failure of the SR-g1 toll project in Orange County, California).
47. Jennifer Nou, Note, Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement
Contracts, 118 YALE L.J- 744, 748 (2oo9).Jennifer Nou is now an administrative law scholar at the
University of Chicago. A Biography ofjennifer Nou, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/nou (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
48. Nou, supra note 47, at 750. Nou advocated "vigorous market incentives for innovation
safeguarded by greater public inspection and transparency." Id. Specifically, she called for mandatory
performance-based contractual provisions enforceable through the explicit designation of candidates
as third-party beneficiaries to voting-machine procurement contracts. Id. at 751.
49. Other scholars have devoted significant time and attention to these general-service
procurements. See generally, e.g., Surya Gablin Gunasekara, The Balancing Act: Weighing National
Security Against Equitable Procurement Practices, 2o FED. CIR. BJ- 569 (2011); Jim Moye, There Is
Always a Better Way: Proposed Legislative Improvements for the Federal Procurement System, 14 RICH.J.L.
& PUB. INT. 307 (2Olo);Jennifer Jo Snider Smith, Competition and Transparency: What Works for
Public ProcurementRefoun, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 85 (2oo8); PatrickJ. DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud
in Military Procurement: A Legal Process Model, 95 YALE LJ- 390 (1985); Lani A. Perlman, Note,
Guarding the Government's Coffers: The Need for Competition Requirements to Safeguard Federal
Government Procurement, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 3187 (2007).
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contracts that implicate individual rights and liberties and complex human
services decisions.
B. HuMAN-SERVICE CONTRACTS
Higher up our conceptual pyramid lie those contracts that represent
nontraditional delegations or public-private partnerships-human-service
contracts, the primary focus of this Article.
Human-service contracts touch on areas traditionally reserved to
government. These areas implicate incommensurables. They affect human
dignity and wellbeing, and as a result, they require heightened scrutiny,
contestation, and accountability. As Professors Aman and Greenhouse have
suggested, "[d]irect human vulnerability mandates more direct forms of
public participation than those more impersonal domains of government
contracts ... in which expenses and revenues may be more definitive."so
To formulate our concerns, we examine five categories of human-service
contracts, providing illustrations for each: private prisons, schemes for
homeless care, private police and paramilitary forces, for-profit immigration
detention centers, and privately administered welfare programs.
i. Private Prisons
Contracts for private prison management offer a particularly apt example
of the human-service contracts that most interest and concern us:51
On the one hand, [prisons] are buildings and workplaces like any
other, servicing inmates as if they were clients-with clean laundry,
occupations, education, and so forth. On the other hand, they are
settings in which responsibility for the care of inmates-nutrition,
medical care, basic life conditions-reach the level of human rights
concerns. The former functions might easily be outsourced, but the
latter-where the fundamental integrity of the body and the basic
dignity of the person are at stake-pose more challenging
questions.52
In other words, the prison contract involves not one simple delegation
but a variety of complex, interwoven responsibilities that must be carried out
by government or private partners.53 Some of these responsibilities seem so
50. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 359.
51. This is so because "[p] risoners-human beings with human needs-cannot reasonably
be covered with the same sort of contract and contract processes that are used, for example, to
construct a bridge or build a road." Id. at 405-o6.
52. Alfred C. Aman,Jr., Private Prisons and theDemocraticDeficit, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC
ORDER: THE OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS 86, 86-87 (Simon Chesterman &
Angelina Fisher eds., 2009).
53. See Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 358-59 ("The 'privatization of prisons' is a
phrase that refers to many spheres of activity that are contractually separate and, in some ways ...
conceptually distinct-as some involve direct substitution of private-for-public providers, whereas
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routine, so banal even, that no one would genuinely question the legitimacy
of outsourcing-for instance, no commentator would seriously argue that
agencies should assume direct responsibility for janitorial services or food
preparation. But the prison context involves other, more sensitive services as
well: security, nutrition, medical care, disciplinary review, and punishment.
To what extent can and should these responsibilities be reallocated to private
partners?54 And to what extent should those partners be constrained by
administrative law?
Prisoners are uniquely vulnerable "beneficiaries" of government
contracts: without the protections of due process and administrative
procedure, and given the trend toward least-cost outsourcing, the risk is
considerable that privately housed inmates will be treated as commodities,
with inadequate attention devoted to their vital and very human interests.
These questions are particularly pressing due to the increasing
application of traditional outsourcing techniques to cases involving the kinds
of human issues we emphasize here: personal dignity and security. While the
vast majority of correctional institutions were operated by government entities
at government expense during the early part of the 2oth century, by the 196os
prisons were increasingly reliant on private services.55 "The first modern
privately-operated prison ... opened in 1976.... In 1987 there were 3,100
inmates in private [prisons] worldwide; in 1998 that number had risen to
132,ooo."56
Why the rapid increase? Professors Aman and Greenhouse have
suggested that, at the outset, before overcrowding became a serious concern,
state authorities were motivated by prison-labor efficiency and self-financing
opportunities.57 As prisoners earned money from their private-sector jobs,
they could contribute much or most of it back to the prison as payment for
their room and board. There also was, early on at least, a rehabilitative
aspiration through job training for prisoners. Eventually, after privatization
became a realistic alternative to traditional prison management, there was so
much incarceration that states (as well as the federal government) looked for
ways to lower the costs of building more prisons.58 Outsourcing to a private
firm allowed the state to amortize its costs while the private provider put up
others involve reconfigurations of purposes and policies.").
54. At the extreme, in some jurisdictions, private entities-such as Sentinel Offender Services-
have the power to issue warrants for probation violations and effectively (extrajudicially) extend
sentences in response to such violations. Nicole Flatow, Private Probation Firm llegally Extended Sentences,
Judge Finds, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 24, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/Og/2 4 /2666
401 /private-probation-firm-illegally-extended-sentencesjudge-finds.
55. Alfred C. Aman,Jr., Privatisation, Prisons, Democracy and Human Rights: The Need to Extend
the Province of Administrative Law, in PRIVATISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALISATION 91, lo6-07 (Koen De Feyter & Felipe G6mez Isa eds., 2005).
56. Id. at i o6.
57. SeeAman & Greenhouse, supra note 22, 384-402.
58. Id. at 388 n.125-
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the necessary capital to build these new facilities in the first place-allowing
the state to meet its obligations without raising taxes.59
The authorizing legislation for privatization generally, and prisons in
particular, is often sparse, and the agencies responsible for establishing these
contracts are primarily tasked with cutting costs and spreading scarce
resources as "efficiently" (sometimes thinly) as possible.so Some statutes set
forth cost-savings rationales for privatization of services; however, "as the cost-
savings requirement gets larger there is an increasing danger that private
prisons would need to sacrifice prisoners' rights to meet the standard."6 '
There is recent evidence thatjust such sacrifices are being made in America's
private prisons today. AJune 2014 expose by the New York Times discussed the
deplorable conditions at the privately run East Mississippi Correctional
Facility, where "[o]pen fires sometimes burn unheeded," "[i]nmates spend
months in near-total darkness," and the walls are "caked" with "[d]irt, feces
and, occasionally, blood."62 Conditions are not much better at the Lake Erie
Correction Institution, a private prison operated by Corrections Corporation
of America ("CCA"). There, a 2012 audit found that inmates lacked access to
59. Id. at 378-79.
6o. As Professor Aman noted in 2009:
There is a continuing debate about whether private prisons offer any real cost
benefit. It is common, however, for some privatization statutes to require a
minimum-percentage cost savings from private prison operators. Some states set a
bar to outsourcing at a certain level of cost savings. While there would be little
point in privatizing if some savings were not anticipated, the risks to prisoners'
rights would seem to increase directly with the scale of the cost-savings
requirement
Aman, supra note 52, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
61. Aman, supra note 55, at lo8. This obsession with savings is apparent in traditional state-
run prisons as well as their private counterparts. In 2003, a writer for the Gadsden Times reported
that the state of Alabama spent an average of just $0.91 per prisoner per day on meals. Carla
Crowder, Running Prisons on the Cheap, GADSDEN TIMEs, http://www.gadsdentimes.com/news/
2003l201/running-prisons-on-the-cheap (last updated Dec. 1, 2003, 7:07 AM). Predictably,
$o.9i doesn't go very far: inmates at Kilby Prison described a particular dehydrated dish as
"chicken explosion," among "many mysterious items" served with the goal of cutting costs. Id.
More recently, infamous Maricopa County, Arizona, SheriffJoe Arpaio boasted about a "special"
Thanksgiving meal of vegetarian turkey soy casserole, clocking in atjust $0.56 per inmate. Shadee
Ashtari, Joe Arpaio Offers Inmates, Fed Only Twice a Day, 5 6-Cent Thanksgiving Meal, HUFFINGTON
POST: PoLITIcs (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/27/Oe-
arpaio-thanksgiving-n-4351729.html. On less "special" occasions, Arpaio feeds inmates only
twice daily, and he eliminated "'salt and pepper' to save taxpayer money." Id. Of course, many
prisons have gone much further than Arpaio-charging prisoners room and board for the
pleasure of dining behind bars. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging
Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY.J. PUB. INT. L. 319,319 (2014).
62. Erica Goode, SeeingSqualor and Unconcern in aMississippiJail, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 4 /o6/o8/us/seeing-squalor-and-unconcern-in-southern-jail.html.
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running water and toilets, while complaints about prison gangs and violence
doubled during the year after the State of Ohio contracted out to CCA. 6 3
Inmate health care, at both traditional governmentally operated prisons
and at privately operated facilities, is also the target of considerable
outsourcing-and the results can be catastrophic. Take, for instance, Prison
Health Services-an entity that moved aggressively into New York prisons
during the late 19gos and early 2000s. A 2005 report by the New York Times
found that Prison Health repeatedly failed to deliver adequate care to
inmates, "provok[ing] criticism from judges and sheriffs, lawsuits from
inmates' families and whistle-blowers, and condemnations by federal, state
and local authorities."6 4 In the years following the New York Times article,
Prison Health rebranded itself as PHS Correctional Healthcare and, following
a merger with a competitor, it now operates under the name Corizon
Health. 65 Yet "the sins of Corizon's [corporate] parents ... are forever linked
with the progeny of their merger."66 The problem may lie with the model
itself: "[c] ompanies like Corizon provide healthcare in prisons andjails under
the [health maintenance organization ("HMO")] model, with an emphasis
on cutting costs-except that prisoners have no other options to obtain medical
treatment except through the contractor."6 7 Prison Legal News recited a variety
63. LAURA A. BISCHOFF, AUDITORS UNCOVER PROBLEMS AT PRIVATE PRISONS IN OHIO, PRISON
PRIVATIZATION ALERT, no. 9, at 15 (2013), http://aoce-online.org/wp-content/uploads/201 3 /
oi/privatization-alert-g.pdf. In a surprising move in August 2016, the Department ofJustice ("DoJ")
announced that it intends to end its use of private prisons: officials will either decline to renew expiring
contracts or will substantially reduce their scope. Matt Zapotosky & Chico HarlanjusticeDepanment Says
It WlEnd Use of Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/20 6/o8/18/justice-department-says-it-will-end-use-of-private-prisons/?utm
term=.b7d1 d 3 e89 df. It remains to be seen whether this policy shift will stick, particularly given the
changeover in the upper echelons of DoJ leadership as the Trump Administration assumes control in
Washington in 2017. It also remains to be seen whether state prison officials follow DoJ's example.
Given the general trend toward broader privatization and hybrid public-private partnerships over the
past two decades, we suspect that an expansive reversion to government-run detention facilities is
unlikely. But seeJoe Davidson, Wl States Follow DOJs Private Prison Move? Some Are Ahead of the Feds, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:37 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-justice-
department-private-prisons-20160826-story.html ("While the impact on states of the Justice
Department's private prison decision remains to be seen, the federal government's strong influence
on prison policy was demonstrated with the 1994 crime bill. It contributed to a prolonged period of
mass incarceration at the federal and state levels and increased use of for-profit facilities.").
64. Paul von Zielbauer, As Health Care in jails Goes Private, zo Days Can Be a Death Sentence,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/200 5 /02/27/nyregion/27jail.html.
65. For an illustration of this change, see Company Overview of Corizon Health, Inc., BLOOMBERC,
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshotasp (last visited Jan. 5, 2017), with
Corizon Launches from Correctional Healthcare Merger, CORIZON HEALTH (June 13, 2011), http://www.
corizonhealth.com/Corizon-News/Corizon-Launches-From-Correctional-Healthcare-Mergerl.
66. Greg Dober, Corizon Needs a Checkup: Problems with Privatized Correctional Healthcare,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/201 4 /mar/1 5 /
corizon-needs-a-checkup-problems-with-privatized-correctional-healthcare.
67. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the problematic health maintenance
organization ("HMO") cost-cutting model, see WALTER M. CADETIE, REGULATING HMOS: AN
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of instances in which lapses by Corizon employees exacerbated prisoner
health problems and contributed to premature deaths.68
Shields v. Illinois Department of Corrections, a 2014 case before the Seventh
Circuit, illustrates the unfortunate consequences that may befall injured
inmates in the private prison industry.69 It also serves as a compelling
reminder that constitutional law may not accord the third-party recipients of
delegated governmental services the same remedy to which those recipients
might otherwise be entitled in a traditional agency context.
Earnest Shields, a former Illinois inmate who injured his shoulder while
lifting weights, brought suit alleging that the private company that provides
medical services for the Illinois Department of Corrections failed to provide
him with prompt and adequate treatment.7o As a result, he "now suffers from
a serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided."7' Shields
argued that the defendants showed deliberate indifference to his needs, a
violation of the Eighth Amendment ordinarily redressable as against state
actors through section 1983.72
Writing for the panel, Judge David Hamilton observed that the "case
illustrates the often arbitrary gaps in the legal remedies under section 1983
for violations of federal constitutional rights."73 Shields may have been the
victim of institutional neglect-perhaps even indifference-but current case
law requires something more. Before the medical contractor itself could be
found liable, Shields would have to prove that the contractor maintained an
unconstitutional policy or custom: the doctrine of respondeat superior has no
application under current section 1983 analysis.74 As for the contractor's
employees, Shields would have to prove specific, identifiable indifference-
and because the Department of Corrections and its private health partners
diffused responsibility for inmate care, "[n] o one doctor knew enough that a
ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COsT-EFFECrIvE MEDICINE, JEROME LEVY ECON. INST. BARD C. PUB.
POL'YBRIEF, no. 47, at 7-12 (1998), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb47.pdf.
68. Dober, supra note 66.
69. Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F-3 d 782 (7th Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 785.
71. Id. The facts of Shields were hardly anomalous: accusations of inadequate medical care
rank among the most common of prisoner complaints. Administrative review boards and courts
sometimes seem troublingly unsympathetic to these complaints. See Jennifer Nelson, COA:
Standard of Care Same for All Doctors, IND. LAW. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.theindianalawyer.
com/coa-standard-of-care-same-for-all-doctors/PARAMS/article/35 6 40 (recounting the facts of
Allen v. Hinchman, an Indiana case in which a Marion County trial court erroneously held that
"doctors practicing in the prison system have a different standard of care than those practicing
in the general population"); see also generally Allen v. Hinchman, 2o N.E. 3 d 863 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (reversing that erroneous decision).
72. Shields, 746 F.3 d at 785.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 789.
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jury could find that he both appreciated and consciously disregarded Shields'
need for prompt surgery."75
While ultimately affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants as required by circuit precedent,Judge Hamilton
explained that the cases that exclude vicarious liability via section 1983 may
"deserve fresh consideration," either by the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc or
by the U.S. Supreme Court.7 6 Although the Supreme Court held in Monell v.
Department of Social Services that "respondeat superior is not a basis for
rendering municipalities liable under section 1983 for the constitutional torts
of their employees,"77 the Court has never ruled that the Monell liability
limitation also extends to private corporations acting under contract.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit and other appellate courts have drawn that
extension.Judge Hamilton noted that Monell itself has come under heavy fire
from commentators -and dissenting Justices; moreover, because neither
Supreme Court precedent nor the text of section 1983 requires courts to
withhold employer liability, courts "should not insulate employers from
respondeat superior liability under § 1983 without powerful reasons to do
So."78
75. Id. at 786. It is worth noting that Shields had at least a shot at pinning liability on the
individual doctors responsible for his care; had the corporation not diffused responsibility, it is
possible that the callous neglect of one or more doctors could have risen to the deliberate
indifference standard. Conversely, had Shields been a federal prisoner, he would have been
entirely out of luck: while section 1983 reaches both state officials and contractors acting under
color of state law, there is no equivalent to the implied damages remedy of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents ofFederal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for suits brought against federal
contractors or the facilities that employ them. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626
(2012) (requiring an inmate at a private federal prison to seek a state tort remedy rather than
the Eighth Amendment Bivens remedy against prison officials); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (declining to extend Bivens to damages actions against private entities acting
under color of federal law); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success ofBivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the IndividualLiability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 80g, 818-27 (201o) (examining the
various limitations of Bivens claims); Allison L. Waks, Note, Federal Incarceration by Contract in a
Post-Minneci World: Legislation to Equalize the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM lo65, 1074-78 (2013) (critiquing the state of the law). Of course, even apart from a
Bivens remedy, a plaintiff may recover against a federal contractor if the plaintiff can fit his claims
within the confines of some other cause of action, such as those arising under statute. Salim v.
Mitchell, No. CV-1 5 -0286-JLQ 2016 WL 1717185, at *9 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016) (allowing
action against psychologists who allegedly implemented CIA torture program, brought pursuant
to the Alien Tort Statute, to proceed to discovery).
76. Shields, 746 F.3 d at 789.
77. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
78. Shields, 746 F.3 d at 792 (emphasis omitted). But for Seventh Circuit precedent, the
panel would have reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
Although the medical contractor had diffused responsibility within its organization such that no
single doctor or health professional could be individually liable for Shields's maltreatment,
respondeat superior would enable courts to pin liability on the real culprit-the entity itself. Id.
at 795 ("[I]n a world of increasingly privatized state services, [respondeat superior] could help
to protect people from tortious deprivations of their constitutional rights.").
got
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Judge Hamilton's call for a reordering of the section 1983 doctrine could
offer significant relief for the victims of constitutional torts in the public-
private context. However, the application of Monell to private corporations is
well settled among the circuits, and an extensive reevaluation seems unlikely
(barring action by the Supreme Court).79
Apart from the harm that inmates may suffer at the hands of private-
sector security personnel and healthcare providers, the increasing private
management of correctional institutions is also pressuring the traditional
system of probation and early release. Private-prison operators frequently
include occupancy requirements in their contracts, requiring a certain
number of inmates at all times (perhaps up to go% capacity) regardless of
whether crime is rising or falling.so Once inmates are finally released from the
confines of these disturbing environments, "poverty capitalism" follows them
back to their communities: for instance, Sentinel Offender Services, a private
supplier of case-management and alcohol/drug monitoring systems, "takes
pride in the 'development of offender funded programs where any of [its]
services can be provided at no cost to the agency.'"8
2. Provision for the Homeless
Tackling the problem of homelessness has long been a commitment for
federal, state, and municipal authorities. For instance, the United States
Interagency Council on Homelessness works to "creat[e] a national
partnership at every level of government and with the private sector to reduce
and end homelessness ... while maximizing the effectiveness of the federal
79. In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself declined to rehear the Shields case en banc, with only
ChiefJudge Wood and Judge Hamilton voting in favor of rehearing. Id. at 782.
8o. Bill Berkowitz, States Guarantee High Pison Populations for Private Prison Industry's Profits,
BUZZFLASH (Oct. 11, 2013), http://truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/prison-populations-pivate-
profits/ 182 4 8-prison-populations-private-profits; Andy Kroll, This Is How Private Prison Companies Make
Millions Even When Crime Rates Fall, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.
motherjones.com/mojo/201 3 /og/private-prisons-occupancy-quota-cca-crime; see also KevinJohnson,
Psivate Purchasing ofPrisons Locks in Occupancy Rates, USA TODAY (Mar. 8,2012, 12: 3 7 PM), http://usa
today 3 o.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-01 /buying-prisons-require-high-occupancy/
53402894/1 (discussing a controversial proposal submitted by Corrections Corporation of America
("CCA") to prison officials in 48 states, offering to buy prisons in exchange for such concessions as 2o-
year minimum occupancy rates of go%).
81. Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Evpanding World of Poverty Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/201 4 /08/2 7 /opinion/thomas-edsall-the-expanding-world-of-pover
ty-capitalism.html. Edsall situated Sentinel's case-management and monitoring services within a
broader trend toward shifting the costs of governmental services to the poor. Id. He acknowledged that
"the cost of being poor has always been exorbitant," as unscrupulous landlords and creditors have
developed a vulture-like ability to feed off of poverty. Id. What has changed is the extent to which
municipalities and other governmental units now charge the poor for the "privilege" of participating
in the criminal justice system-"offender-funded law enforcement." Id. For a comparison, see also
Special Series: Guilty and ChargeAd, NPR NEws INvESGATIONS, http://www.npr.org/seies/313986316/
guilty-and-charged (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
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government in contributing to the end of homelessness."8 2 The Department
of Veterans Affairs maintains a resource division to assist homeless veterans
with housing, job training, and health care. 83 And the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act requires the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") to identify federal buildings and real properties that
are currently underutilized and to develop criteria with respect to the
suitability of such buildings for housing the homeless.84
Even as government has assumed responsibility for persons experiencing
homelessness, it has also outsourced related services to private vendors. Not
unlike private prisons, the outsourcing of these functions to the private sector
also involves what we call human-service contracts. For example, in 1993, the
Board of County Commissioners of Miami-Dade County established the
Miami-Dade County Homeless Trust to administer proceeds of a one-percent
excise tax on certain food and beverage purchases for the benefit of homeless
persons in the county.85 In addition to tax revenues, the Miami-Dade Trust
receives and manages grants from HUD and state agencies.86 As one
commentator suggested, "[t]he creation of the trust and a public/private
partnership in Miami has by no means eliminated the problems of
homelessness in Miami-Dade County, but it is theoretically a model and a step
in the right direction."87 The Trust contributed to Miami-Dade's selection as
one of six HUD model city initiative grantees. 8
The Miami-Dade Trust represents a noteworthy hybrid partnership that
delivers essential services to combat homelessness, but not all such
outsourcing has been so successful. In 2oo8, the Department of Justice
entered into a settlement agreement with the District of Columbia, resolving
an investigation into widespread Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
violations at DC-area shelters, operated by contract with the Community
Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness.89 In 2011, one of the largest
nonprofit shelters in Los Angeles decided to abandon its government-funded
82. About USICH, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, https://www.usich.gov/
about-usich (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
83. Ending Veteran Homelessness, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/homeless
(last visitedJan- 5, 2017).
84. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, § 501, 101 Stat. 482,
509 (1987) (codified as amended at 4 2 U.S.C. § 11411 (2012)).
85. About the Homeless Trust, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, http://www.homelesstrust.org/about-
homeless-trust.asp (last updated Oct. 28, 2016, 11:22 AM).
86. Id.
87. Susan R. Jones, Tackling Homelessness Through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 385,405 (2000).
88. Id. at 4o6.
89. Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreement in U.S. v. District of Columbia, ADA.GOV (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.ada.gov/dc shelter-factsheethtm.
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programs because its costs were not consistently covered and its payments
were severely delayed.9o
In a 2oo8 study, Steven Cohen and William Eimicke of Columbia
University's School of International and Public Affairs explored the incentives
of contracting out to nonprofit organizations for essential human services,
including homeless care.9' They identified several benefits: nonprofit
organizations are mission-oriented; they are unconcerned with achieving a
"return on equity or profit"; they are unencumbered by many civil-service and
procurement rules; and they are replaceable in the event that services fall
below an established baseline.92 But Cohen and Eimicke identified several
drawbacks as well: it can be difficult to control nonprofit activities due to the
organizations' own distinct sense of mission; the organizations tend to have
"poorly developed ... budget[ary] and management information systems";
and " [t]he transaction costs of procuring and maintaining contracts" with the
organizations may run high.93 Thus, in New York City, which has "developed
a system of service provision to homeless families that is largely implemented
through contracts with nonprofit service providers,"94 Cohen and Eimicke
found a lack of comprehensive client needs management and inconsistent
policies regarding quality of service.95
The drawbacks that Cohen and Eimicke observe with respect to
contracting out for homeless care parallel in some respects the challenges that
arise in the context of private prisons.9 6 In both scenarios, the contracting
agency may have different incentives and objectives than its private partner
(though private prisons are more likely to prioritize profit taking, while
homeless-care providers may be motivated by ideological or perhaps religious
principles). And in both scenarios, transaction costs-always difficult to
predict at the outset of a new contracting venture-can run high. More
fundamentally, both contexts involve delegation of crucial governmental
services to private actors, raising questions about: (i) whether such
delegations are appropriate and (2) if so, to what extent the public should
play a role in the outsourcing process.
go. Alexandra Zavis, Homeless Shelter to Drop Government-Funded Programs, L.A. TIMES (June
25, 201 1), http://articles.latimes.com/2011 /jun/ 2 5 /local/la-me-shelter-cuts-20 10625.
gi. See generally Steven Cohen & William Eimicke, Managing Reinvention: Contracting with
Non-Profits in NYC's Homeless Program (Nov. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
columbia.edu/-sc 3 2/documents/managingmg.pdf.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 3-4.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id. at 8-9.
96. These problems also arise with for-profit immigration detention facilities. See infra Part
II.B.4 .
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3. Private Police and Paramilitary Forces
In the post-9/ 11 security state, with officials at all levels of government
struggling to balance such interests as cost-effectiveness and privacy with the
need for increasingly sophisticated security strategies, public-private
partnerships have presented an attractive vehicle for increasing manpower in
vulnerable areas and enhancing technology. Some proposals seem
compatible with the human interests at stake in the policing context; others
seem extreme.
In a 2014 article, Professor Karena Rahall described the recent and
dramatic rise of public-private policing partnerships.97 Rahall explained that
these partnerships come in two varieties: they may involve information
sharing to enhance overall safety, or they may involve outsourcing of support
services such as public-housing development safety patrols, emergency
dispatching, towing of impounded vehicles, data entry, and forensics.98 As of
2006, approximately 450 of these partnerships existed nationwide.99
Thus far, Rahall noted, attempts to wholly outsource a municipal police
force to a private security entity have not succeeded, "but the idea has been
considered, and given current trends, plans to sell off entire departments are
likely not far from realization."' As a stopgap while the legal kinks of such
extreme outsourcing are straightened out, some jurisdictions have adopted
so-called business improvement districts ("BIDs")-urban revitalization
models which "typically assess a tax on local business and property owners to
fund supplementary neighborhood services including security."lo'
More extreme than municipal police outsourcing to private security
forces (though also further on the fringe of current discourse) are proposals
for the state authorization of private paramilitary forces to support the
mission of state police agencies and the National Guard.ol In 2011, a
Montana legislator proposed the creation of a volunteer armed paramilitary
97. See generally Karena Rahall, The Siren is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward
Privatization ofPublic Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633 (2014).
98. Id. at 648-49.
99. Id. at 648.
1oo. Id. at 65 8.
101. John MacDonald et al., The Privatization ofPublic Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: Do Business
Improvement Districts Reduce Violent Crime AmongAdolescents?, 47 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 62 1, 62 2 (2013).
Additionally, "[a] 2001 survey of over 250 BIDs across the United States found that 36 percent
were 'very involved' in a range of security projects including the provision of supplementary
private security guards, purchasing electronic security systems, and working closely with the city
police force." Id. at 626.
102. In a sense, these paramilitary proposals can be analogized to Vice President Cheney's
proposal to deploy military troops to arrest U.S. citizens associated with Al-Qaeda-bypassing the Posse
Comitatus Act and other checks on military abuse. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, The Cheney Plan to Deploy
the US. Military on US. Soi, SALON (July 25, 2009, 5:26 AM), http://www.salon.com/200 9/o 7 /25/military 4; Mark Mazzetti & DavidJohnston, Bush Weighed Using Military in Arrests, N.Y TIMES (July
24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/2 5 /us/2 5 detain.html.
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group to "fill the gap between community service organizations ... and to
provide the state and its local communities with the ability to call upon trained
and organized volunteers when necessary resources are otherwise
unavailable."03 The Montana bill died in committee. A similar 2007 proposal
in Arizona would have created a "Homeland Security Force" to supplement
National Guard troops currently patrolling the border.o4 The bill was vetoed
by then-Governor Janet Napolitano; subsequent legislative attempts to create
such a force, in 2011 and again in 2012, failed.1o5
While domestic paramilitary forces have not (yet) gained legislative
traction, the use of armed private security contractors overseas has become
far more prevalent since the launch of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given
the sharp criticism these particular delegations have received, and given the
high risk of abuse where nonmilitary entities are imbued with military powers
in foreign, perhaps effectively stateless jurisdictions,oo we address these
contract forces in Part II.C, along with other arrangements that are potentially
(and arguably) beyond the scope of constitutionally permissible delegation.
4. For-Profit Immigration Detention Centers and Private Repatriation
Just as private entities-principally CCA and the GEO Group, Inc.1o7
operate prisons on behalf of state and federal corrections departments,os
such entities also operate detention centers on behalf of the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), housing undocumented
103. H.R. 278, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. § 22 (Mont. 2011).
104. Tim Steller, Militias in Arizona Thrive Despite Lack of Authorizing Law, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(May 27, 2012), http://tuson.com/news/local/border/militias-in-arizona-thrive-despite-lack-
of-authorizing-law/article-o87eg8b6-5d8e-5e65-ba98-ecg8a 3 O 9 87 5 .html.
105. Id.
io6. This is not to suggest that abuses are necessarily the product of privatization. After all, public
security forces and military units have certainly committed their share of atrocities throughout history.
But the abuses flowing from the involvement of private firms in the Iraq War illustrate a particular
hazard with outsourcing. In the chaos of military operations, private firms may bypass or frustrate the
military's chain of command such that abuses which might otherwise be prevented or swiftly corrected
go unchecked. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2o4/10/2 3 /us/blackwater-verdicthtml; Matt Apuzzo,
Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terns for Killing Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/04/1 4 /us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-
civilians.html. For another illustration, see generally INDEP. PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DET. OPERATIONS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), http://
permanentaccess.gpo.gov/lps53245/www.defenselink-mil/new/aug2004/d2oo40824finalreport.pdf
(discussing the Abu Ghraib scandal and subsequent investigation).
107. In 2oog, roughly half of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainees
were housed in private detention facilities. That same year, CCA spent nearly $2o million on
lobbying. GEO spent around a quarter of a million dollars. See DET. WATCH NETWORK, THE
INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRYIN THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION BUSINESS 2 (2011),
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN% 2oPrivate% 2 oPriso
n% 2olnfluence%2oReport.pdf.
1o8. See supra Part II.B. 1.
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immigrants who are working their way through the immigration appeals
process or awaiting deportation.x09 Immigration detention is big business for
private actors: "In fact, civil immigration detention is credited with saving the
private prison industry from the brink of bankruptcy by forcing federal
immigration authorities to seek additional space in which to house
[detainees]."-o
Private immigration detention centers include the Stewart Detention
Center in southern Georgia (1,752 beds),' the Elizabeth Detention Center
in NewJersey (300 beds),", the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona (1,500
beds),"3 and a facility near Otay Mesa, California, which opened in 2015
(1,482 beds)."4 In a fascinating hybrid relationship, CCA also assumed
responsibility for operations at the new South Texas Family Residential
Center, a detention camp for undocumented female and child immigrants."5
However, this particular transaction did not involve a standard contract
between CCA and the federal government." 6 Instead, the facility is funded by
ICE through payments to the town of Eloy, Arizona-Eloy channels the funds
to CCA, which in turn pays Eloy for its accounting services."7 Ostensibly, the
arrangement-an "Intergovernmental Services Agreement"-was designed to
avoid competitive bidding requirements and speed up construction of the
new facility." 8
Private entities are also playing an increasingly significant role in
deportation. Under federal law, hospitals that receive Medicare funding are
required to attempt to stabilize all emergency patients regardless of their
log. Relatedly, the Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges that "[t]he majority of BOP
inmates in private prisons are sentenced criminal aliens who may be deported upon completion
of their sentence." Contract Prisons, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/
contract facilities.jsp (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
110. Spencer Bruck, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability and Private Contracting on
Health Care Services for Immigrants in Civil Detention, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 487,491 (2011).
I11. Stewart Detention Center, CCA, http://www.cca.com/facilities/stewart-detention-center
(last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
112. Elizabeth Detention Center, CCA, http://www.cca.com/facilities/elizabeth-detention-
center (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
113. Eloy Detention Center, CCA, http://www.cca.com/facilities/eloy-detention-center (last
visitedJan. 5, 2017).
114. Otay Mesa Detention Center, CCA, http://www.cca.com/facilities/otay-mesa-detention-
center (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
115. John Burnett, How Will a Small Town in Arizona Manage an ICE Facility in Texas?, NPR(Oct. 28, 2014,4:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/2o 4 /10/28/ 3 5 9 4 l1980/how-will-a-small-town-
in-arizona-manage-an-ice-facility-in-texas.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Tanner Clinch, Prison in Texas BigBusiness forEloy, PINAL CENTRAL: THE ELOY
ENTERPRISE (July 7, 2016), http://www.pinalcentral.com/eloy-enterprise/news/prison-in-texas-
big-business-for-eloy/article_680 4 ab3 4 -4 3 ce-1 le6-9ffi4-7f882a 5 c 918c.html.
118. Burnett, supra note 1'5.
immigration status."9 Yet the federal purse closes as soon as undocumented
patients are deemed stable-and privately operated hospitals, unable to
recoup often massive expenses associated with long-term care, are confronted
with the option of "medically repatriating" these patients. Specifically, one
study notes:
In an effort to save costs, and within the broader context of the
privatization of immigration regulation and increasing immigration
enforcement by local actors, many public and private hospitals take
it on themselves to enforce the nation's immigration laws by
deporting desperately ill immigrants directly from their hospital
beds. In this new frontier of privatized immigration enforcement,
hospitals act unilaterally or in concert with private transport
companies to deport seriously ill or catastrophically injured
migrants.'
The authors of one study documented "over 8oo cases of successful or
attempted medical repatriation" between 2007 and 2013. 12 Because the
process "takes place in the shadows without any governmental regulation," "
the actual number of such repatriations may be higher.
5. Privately Administered Welfare Programs
Economist Peter Self describes the "welfare state" as those "basic
services-principally social security, health, education and to some extent
housing and transport-which should be made available to all citizens."123
The welfare state also encompasses economic rights (e.g., employment
opportunities, minimum wage, and workplace protections).24 The welfare
state arose during the middle of the last century, but it came under attack as
the century wound down-with critics challenging its rising costs, its rigid and
inflexible services, and its arguable failure to achieve greater equality. 125
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 dd(b) (2012); Special Responsibilities of Medicare Hospitals in
Emergency Cases, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (2o6).
12o. Lori A. Nessel, Disposable Workers: Applying a Human Rights Framework to Analyze Duties
Owed to Seriously Injured orIll Migrants, 19 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61, 63-64 (2012) (footnote
omitted).
121. Emily Orloff, Unconstitutional Medical Repatriation, IMMIGRATIONPROFBLOG (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/ 2 o13 /o 4 /unconstitutional-medical-repatfiation.
html; see also SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW'S CTR. FOR Soc. JUSTICE & N.Y. LAWYERS FOR THE PUB.
INTEREsT, DISCHARGE, DEPORTATION, AND DANGEROUS JOURNEYS: A STUDY ON THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICAL REPATRIATION 3 (2012), http://www.nylpi.org/images/FE/chain234siteType8/site2o3/
client/FINAL%2MED2oREPAT%2oREPORT%2oFOR%20olT.pdf.
122. Nessel, supra note 120, at 65.
123. PETER SELF, GOVERNMENT BY THE MARKET? THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 113
(1993).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 117-20.
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In response to such criticism, and in the context of broader neoliberal
deregulation, welfare services at all levels-municipal, state, federal-have
shifted to the private sector. Professor Self describes four incarnations of this
shift:
1. Contracting out: "the state hires private providers to deliver some
service but retains full financial and political responsibility for the
outcome"; 126
2. Voluntary agent approach: the state contracts with private
providers to perform certain functions, while retaining oversight
powers;' 27
3. Mandatory agent approach: the state requires private entities to
perform services, while retaining some responsibility for the
outcome; 28 and
4. Subsidy approach: the state incentivizes private actors to perform
services, but retains only "indirect responsibility for the
outcomes."'-9
During the mid-2ooos, the State of Indiana embarked on a privatization
project in line with Self's second incarnation. The idea was to replace
traditional caseworkers with a "remote eligibility" model, whereby claimants
could apply for benefits and complete related transactions through remote
call centers.3o The State would theoretically retain policymaking authority
and an operational role in the "modernization project," but private vendors
would develop the infrastructure and (eventually) administer portions of the
system.'3'
A coalition of companies led by IBM and Affiliated Computer Systems
("ACS") rose to the challenge, and the State awarded a contract to that
coalition in 2oo6.132 The contract proved disastrous, almost from the start.
Software malfunctioned, calls went unanswered, and thousands of Hoosiers
had their Medicaid and SNAP benefits suddenly and erroneously
terminated.33 The timing was particularly problematic, as the IBM coalition
began assuming administrative control over welfare claims in 2007, just one
short year before the Great Recession.34 Although no one reasonably could
126. Id. at 122.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
13o. Alfred C. AmanJr., Globalization and the Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana,
20 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGALSTUD. 377, 397 (2013).
131. Id. at 4 6.
132. Id. at 3 99.
133. Id.at 4o9-o.
134. Id.
gog
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have foreseen the extent to which home losses and rising unemployment
would further burden the strained welfare system, the IBM coalition was
utterly unprepared to deal with those recessionary ramifications.
Governor Mitch Daniels canceled the IBM contract in 2oog while
granting ACS "a new eight-year contract worth $638 million."35 IBM and the
State of Indiana sued one another; a state superior court awarded $52 million
to IBM in 2012, but the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in
early 2014 for a "determination of damages suffered by the state."36 On
August 8, 2014, the Indiana Supreme Court announced that it would review
the decision;57 the court heard oral argument that October.'-3 Finally, in
March 2016-more than six years after litigation commenced-the Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that IBM's collective breaches were material in light of
the contract as a whole, and the court remanded to the trial court for an
assessment of damages. 39
The Indiana/IBM debacle raises at least three questions. First, was there
something inherently wrong with the "modernization project" as conceived
by the Daniels administration? If not, did the problem lie in the execution of
the project-and if so, which party bears the blame for that? Finally, to the
extent that state governments may continue to privatize their welfare systems,
what lessons can be learned? In fact, many states have contracted with private
parties for certain aspects of welfare benefits administration, often with mixed
results. 40
135. Matea Gold et al., Indiana's Bumpy Road to Privatization, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/jun/2 4 /nation/a-na-indiana-privatize-201 10624.
136. Chris Sikich, Supreme Court to ConsiderlBM Welfare Privatization Case, INDYSTAR (Aug. 8, 2014,
12:15 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/money/ 2 o1 4 /o8/o8/supreme-court-consider-ibm-
welfare-privitaztion-case/ 13776633.
137. Id.
138. Brandon Smith, Indiana Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in IBM Case, IND. PUB.
MEDIA (Oct. 30, 2014), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/state-supreme-court-hears-oral-
arguments-ibm-case-74000.
139. Indiana v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 51 N.E.3 d 150, 168 (Ind. 2016). Even after this
landmark ruling, however, the controversy remained far from settled. In July 2016, the Indiana
Supreme Court removed Judge David Dreyer, formerly the presiding trial judge, after the state
accused him of bias and "exceed[ing] his [judicial] authority." See Dave Stafford, justices Remove
Dreyerfrom State v. IBM Case, IND. LAw. (July 5, 2016), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/justices-
remove-dreyer-from-state-v-ibm-case/PARAMS/article/4o8o.
140. In 2005, for instance, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission contracted
with a private welfare management company to develop a new computer system and operate call
centers. See Alex Cohen, Welfare 'Outsourcing' Hits a Snag in Texas, NPR (Aug. 22, 2006, 1:OO PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5 6 goo44. Results were mixed: Although
the program was allegedly on track to save hundreds of millions of dollars, welfare recipients
complained about long hold times, misinformation, and improper benefit denials. Id. Seventeen
states have also contracted with Xerox to administer their electronic benefit transfer systems. The
Xerox platform, however, came under fire in October 2013, ironically during the much-maligned
government shutdown, when a temporary computer "glitch" prevented shoppers from using their
food stamp debit cards. See Mike Ludwig, Food Stamp Outage Highlights Problems with Privatization of
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Most welfare privatization is occurring at the state level, since most
welfare programs are state administered (even if substantially federally
funded).'14 But some conservative politicians and (mainly conservative)
commentators have argued for privatization within the federal government's
two largest social welfare initiatives, Social Security'42 and Medicare.143 While
congressional defenders of the Social Security Administration have thus far
resisted these calls to privatize, aspects of Medicare have gone private, most
significantly with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 ("MMA").'44 As the overall state of contemporary
Public Services, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 18, 2013), http://truth-outorg/news/item/19481-food-stamp-
outage-highlights-problems-with-privatization-of-public-services. Other states have launched
initiatives geared specifically toward child welfare. Florida privatized its foster-care system over a
decade ago, while Kansas transferred the majority of its child-welfare services (including foster
care, adoption, and family preservation) to private actors starting in the mid-i 99os. See Lisa Snell,
Child Welfare Privatization Update, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://reason.org/news/
show/apr-2013-child-welfare-privatizatio. Nebraska followed suit with a privatization initiative in
2009:
Across the board, lawmakers, foster parents and child advocates now say Nebraska's
privatization effort failed because it was ill-conceived, rushed, and inadequately
funded. They also say often the caseworkers hired by the private companies had
caseloads that were too heavy and in many cases did not have enough training to
deal with the complexities of the welfare system.
Id.; see also, e.g., Kevin O'Hanlon, Privatization Fails: Nebraska Tries Again to Reform Child Welfare, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRrIY (last updated May 19, 2014, i2:1g PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/o8/
21/10706/privatization-fails-nebraska-tries-again-reform-child-welfare; Deena Winter, Feds Demand
Nebraska Repay $22 Million for Botched Child Welfare Reform, NEB. WATCHDOG (Jan. 22, 2014), http://
watchdog.org/l24923/foley-repay-22-million.
141. Three core welfare programs, administered at the state level, rely in large part on
federal block and matching grants. Compare Daniel Sutter, Welfare Block Grants as a Guide for
Medicaid Reform 2-3 (Mercatus Ctr. at Geo. Mason U., Working Paper No. 13-07),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Sutter WelfareBlockGrantsv 3 .pdf (discussing the
block grants that have funded TANF following Clinton-era welfare reform legislation), with LIZ
SCHOTr ET AL., How STATES USE FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDS UNDER THE TANF BLOCK GRANT,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 18, 20-22 (Oct- 15, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/ 4 -8-5tanfCo.pdf (discussing recent legislative proposals to convert
Medicaid and SNAP funding to the block-grant model).
142. See generally, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975 (2000);Jerly W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747 (2001); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization ofSocial Security: Assessing
Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000); Kathryn L.
Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131 (1998).
143. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Struggle for the Soul ofMedicare, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 410, 413
(2004) ("Consistent with conservative initiatives in other areas of social policy, such as education
or job training, the most visible assault on Medicare's structure has been the promotion of
privatization... . The rhetoric may have died down, but the thrust to privatization of Medicare
by pushing more and more beneficiaries into private plans has not").
144. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter "MMA"]; see also generally Robert I. Field & Richard G. Stefanacci, Beyond Drug
Coverage: The Cumulative Effect of Privatization Reforms in the Medicare Modernization Act, 1 ST. LOUIs
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governance continues to shift toward public-private partnerships and
outsourcing, Social Security and Medicare privatization may gain political
support in response to the precarious state of the trust funds.145 This
possibility seems all the more real in 2017, as Republicans assume control of
Congress and the White House for the first time since 2oo6.
C. CONTRACTING BEYOND THE SCOPE OFPERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
The OMB Circular No. A-76, first issued in 1966 and most recently
updated in 2003, purports to retain certain "inherently governmental"
activities in-house-that is, within the agencies themselves.14 6 The circular
explains that "[a]n inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by
government personnel."147 Among the examples provided are activities that
"[s]ignificantly affect[] the life, liberty, or property of private persons."4 8
While Circular A-76 affords some guidance to agencies, important
questions remain about the extent to which particular activities should qualify
as inherently governmental. These questions have evoked discussion and
debate among administrative law scholars.'49
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 207 (2007) (discussing the history of Medicare privatization and
highlighting such MMA reforms as the conversion of Medicare Part C into Medicare Advantage
and the introduction of health savings accounts).
145. Nancy Altman, Trump and Ryan Agree: Let's Dismantle Social Security, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG,
http://www.huffingtonposLcom/nancy-altman/trump-and-yan-agree-lets b_9 9 9 265 6.html (last
updated May 16, 2o6). But see generallyJOSEPH WHITE, FALSE ALARM: WHY THE GREATEST THREAT TO
SOCIAL SECURIY AND MEDICARE IS THE CAMPAIGN To "SAVE" THEM (2001) (suggesting that the
compulsory nature of Social Security and the baseline safety-net function of Medicare are these
programs' greatest assets; opposing privatization; and arguing instead for moderate reforms within the
existing systems).
146. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 24, at A-1. The broader purpose of Circular A-
76 is to subject commercial (i.e., not inherently governmental) activities to public-private
competitions in an effort to maximize efficiency and productivity. Id. However, A-76 competitions
have been suspended at the DoD-the agency with by far the greatest reliance on private
contractors-since 2oo8. See VALERIE ANN BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CIRCULAR A-
76 AND THE MORATORIUM ON DOD COMPETITIONS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 24
(2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40854.pdf.
147. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 24, at A-2.
148. Id. The circular expressly excludes from the definition of inherently governmental
activities the operation of "guard services, convoy security services, pass and identification
services, plant protection services, or the operation of prisons or detention facilities." Id. at A- 3
(emphasis added).
149. The questions are not uniquely American. As outsourcing and privatization have
become commonplace in many advanced economies, scholars and jurists are grappling with the
limits of permissible delegation under various constitutional frameworks. Results vary. In Israel,
for instance, the High Court of Justice struck down legislation that would have established a
privately operated prison, an unremarkable institution in American political society, as
unconstitutional. See generally Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme
Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 690 (2010); see also generally
Malcolm M. Feeley, The Unconvincing Case Against Private Prisons, 8g IND. L.J 1401 (2014)
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Professor Paul Verkuil has been a leading voice calling for restraint with
respect to private participation in inherently governmental activities,
particularly in the military context. Writing in 2oo6, Professor Verkuil noted
that the "relationship of government to the private sector is very much in flux
these days."5o He elaborated:
The number of private contractors doing the work of government
has accelerated, while the number of federal employees needed to
supervise them has eroded. This imbalance has negative
consequences for public management generally, but it specifically
makes surveillance of privatized activities an urgent matter. When
combined with the loss of key government personnel, this lack of
oversight and control becomes an inevitable consequence of
privatization, producing imbalance between those in government
who should oversee and those in the private sector who are meant
to be overseen.'5
Perhaps no category of delegation has generated more negative publicity
in recent years than the use of private military and security companies
("PMSCs") in overseas operations. After all, one scholar has noted:
The relationship between governments and [PMSCs] can take a
number of forms. PMSCs can be registered in one state and provide
services to another state, for example, by assisting the armed forces
of that other state .... Alternatively, PMSCs may be providing
services to the armed forces of the state in which they are
incorporated, whether at home or abroad. They may also be
recruited by private actors, particularly corporations in need of
better security than that which can be provided by the state on the
territory of which they operate. 15
Professor Angelina Fisher has observed that "[p]rivatization of security
functions and proliferation of PMSCs have taken place without a
corresponding outsourcing of accountability regimes."53 Whereas domestic
(rejecting the state monopoly theory against privatization in which the Israeli High Court
anchored its decision).
150. Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 397, 399 (2oo6) (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 399-400. Among those activities that should qualify as inherently governmental,
Professor Verkuil has identified interrogation of prisoners, id. at 441-42, and at least oversight
of airport security, if not the function of TSA officers themselves. See Paul R. Verkuil, The
Publicization ofAirport Security, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2243, 2251 (2oo6).
152. Olivier De Schutter, The Responsibility ofStates, in PRIVATE SECURIY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS 25, 25 (Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher
eds., 2009).
153. Angelina Fisher, Accountability to Whom?, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS 46, 46 (Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher
eds., 2009).
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courts and administrative agencies supply U.S. persons with venues for airing
grievances and seeking redress against domestically situated defendants, it is
difficult to pin liability on PMSCs operating transnationally with a
multinational work force: "An individual injured in Iraq by a Peruvian
employee of a British PMSC may have a difficult time finding a forum in which
to seek redress for injuries."54 The problem is exacerbated when PMSCs
operate (as they often do) in countries with weak governance structures.'55
In a 2013 article, Professor Charles Tiefer proposed excluding PMSC
contractors from such "high-risk" environments as personal security details
and convoy security in areas of enemy strength.s 6 Current DoD rules bar
contractors from activities closely related to combat, yet many warzone
activities that fall short of organized campaigns still implicate significant
human-rights concerns:
The years of use of [contractors] in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown
the great harm that comes from allowing use of [contractors] for
high-risk functions and only limiting combat functions. Local
nationals are seriously alienated, government funds flow through
[contractors] to warlords and the enemy, and [contractors] become
especially remote from accountability when they are subcontractors
or sub-subcontractors.157
Concerns over inherently governmental activities in zones of foreign
conflict transcend the use of PMSC contractors on security missions.
Commentators have also expressed concern about contract personnel who
gather intelligence' 5 or who provide direct support in the "kill chain," the
method of dynamic targeting that has become characteristic of 21st-century
warfare.'so And here at home, critics are wary of increasing reliance by the
154 Id. at 47; see also Cooley, supra note 25, at 257 ("In [Iraq], the adoption of cost-plus
contracts, poor oversight, and a lack of central coordination and management led to nearly
unchecked autonomy on the part of larger contractors.").
155. Fisher, supra note 153, at 47.
156. Charles Tiefer, Restrain "Risky Business": Treat High-Risk Private Security Contractors as
Inherently Governmental, 5o HARV.J. ONLEGIS. 209, 213 (2013).
157 Id. at 223.
158 See Keric D. Clanahan, Wielding a "Vey Long, People-Intensive Spear": Inherently
Governmental Functions and the Role of Contractors in U.S. Department of Defense Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Missions, 7o A.F. L. REv. 119, 173-78 (2013); Lindsay Windsor, Note, James Bond, Inc.:
Private Contractors and Covert Action, 1o GEO. L.J. 1427, 1428-30 (2013).
159. "The standard [unmanned aircraft system] combat air patrol ... mission consists of six
principal steps-find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA), also known simply as the
'kill chain.'" Clanahan, supra note 158, at 165. While contractors are precluded under current
regulations from literally dropping bombs or launching missiles, they may play a robust role in
the kill chain:
Providing tactical intelligence directly to ground troops to help them locate, track
and engage enemy forces is clearly within the kill chain-without good intelligence,
the commander is operating at a huge disadvantage.... Additionally, while precise
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nation's espionage services-the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the
Pentagon's Counterintelligence Field Activity unit-on private contractors.60
This Article primarily aims to advance a statutory solution to cure the
accountability deficit and the endangerment of individual rights inherent in
human-service contracting; it is beyond the scope of this Article to precisely
delineate which contracts represent constitutionally permissible delegations
and which contracts may be impermissible., 6
But however economically advantageous private contractors may be for
the military or for other highly sensitive instrumentalities of the state, at least
targeting is regarded as an important, humane, objective, it is still direct support of
combat activities. Similarly, using lasers to designate targets for strikes by manned
aircraft or artillery is often the critical penultimate step before an attack.... An
overly constricted view of the kill chain would ignore the close connection
[unmanned aerial vehicle ("UAV")] pilots, sensor operators, and laser designators
can have to a combat role. Although the laser guided missile may be launched from
another location, the laser emission or data coming from the UAV is often the key
component to ensuring the missile strikes what the ground force commander needs
to be taken out.
Id. at 184-
1 6o. Simon Chesterman, Intelligence Services, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMrrs 184, 184-85 (Simon Chesterman & Angelina
Fisher eds., 2009). Chesterman argues that three areas of intelligence privatization are
particularly problematic because they involve private actors in inherently governmental activity:
electronic surveillance, black ops detainee transport, and-most troublingly-interrogation. In
the now-infamous Abu Ghraib scandal, although 12 uniformed personnel were convicted of
various crimes, "[n]o charges have been laid against contractors, despite repeated allegations that
they participated in abuse." Id. at 192.
161. For this reason, we are not prepared to itemize an exhaustive list of inherently governmental
activities, though we certainly recognize that some activities must remain "in-house" regardless of the
procedural protections that would constrain a private contractor. Cf Paul R Verkuil, The Nondelegable
Duty to Govern, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Spring 2oo6, at 4, 5 ("If the President assigns duties to private
contractors that are normally performed by either principal or 'inferior' officers of the United States,
the vertical dimension of separation of powers is triggered. Under Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. I (1976),
officers of the United States exert 'significant authority'; this authority is inherent and exclusive to the
executive function. Transfer of these kinds of functions to private hands, whether intentional or not,
violates the authority delegated to the executive under the Constitution. For example, the President
appoints military officers subject to senatorial concurrence. Their duties are within the constraints of
the Constitution. When these officers conduct military operations they are exercising command
authority. When private contractors perform these functions, such as interrogation of prisoners in Iraq,
the constitutional connection is broken. Significant duties cannot devolve to private contractors under
Buckley any more than they can be performed by congressionally appointed officials.").
Other highly sensitive, inherently governmental activities may include peacekeeping
operations, see generally Chia Lehnardt, Peacekeeping, in PRIVATE SECuRnlY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE
OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITs 205 (Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher eds.,
2009); criminal prosecution, see Tyler Grove, Note, Are All Prosecutorial Activites "Inherently
Governmental"?: Applying State Safeguards for Victim-Retained Private Prosecutions to Outsourced Prosecutions,
40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 991 (2011); and death penalty appeals, see Jan Pudlow, The Pros and Cons of
Privatizing Death Penalty Appeals, FLA B. NEWS (Mar. 1, 2003), http://www.floridabar.org/DIV
COM/JN/jnnewsoi .nsf/Articles/8CE983F4 34 2 3 0 3 CC8 5 2 5 6CD 4oo7 3 9 EFC.
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some bright lines must be drawn to maintain collective decision making and
collective implementation for those governmental activities that most
profoundly implicate individual rights.
III. A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN-SERVICE CONTRACTS
Because neither the APA nor many state administrative-procedure
statutes provide sufficient protection for individual rights in the types of
human-service contracts discussed above, we turn our attention to an
alternative: a new statutory framework that would preserve the flexibility of
contracting and outsourcing while subjecting human-service contracts to
heightened transparency and public-participation requirements. I 62We think
this solution makes sense, given that government-by-contract is so prevalent
today. 63 Agencies are much like many of the transnational corporations they
regulate: they conduct their business through contracts, with an emphasis on
relationship building. Our proposal would not undermine these
contemporary norms; however, as we make clear, there are many issues that
should remain public and subject to a new type of administrative law. To this
end, we have modeled our statutory framework on the elements of a contract
itself. Specifically, we have identified three focal points of human-service
contracts. 64 This approach presents three opportunities to ensure that
delegations to private actors conform to the first principle of administrative
law-preserving due process and protecting humanitarian values.' 6 5
The first focal point concerns contractformation. Specifically, we consider
those factors that influence an agency to outsource in the first place and that
weigh on the agency's choice to delegate in toto or to form an integrated
partnership. We also consider which stakeholders should be entitled to
participate in the process of bidding, drafting, and finalizing the agreement.
The second focal point concerns terms. Here, we consider which values
and principles agencies ought to enshrine in their agreements, and what
language they must include. We suggest that, with careful drafting guided by
162. Throughout this Part, we refer periodically to provisions of the ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU
AdministrativeProcedure, and particularly to Book IV of those Model Rules (dealing with the intersection
of administrative law and contract). We are indebted to Paul Craig, Professor of English Law at the
University of Oxford and Visiting Professor at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, for bringing
this document to our attention. For an online version of Book IV, see JEAN-BERNARD AUBY ET AL.,
RENEUAL MODEL RULES ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (2014), http://www.reneual.eu/
images/Home/BooklV-Contracts online version individualized.final.2o14-09-03.pdf.
163. See, e.g., Aman, supra note io, at 254; Metzger, supra note 2o, at 1369.
164. The discussion in this Part focuses on human-service contracts, as these contracts are
of greatest interest and concern to us. The statutory framework we propose may have some
application to general-service contracts and procurements-but the extent to which even those
more traditional contracts warrant reform is largely beyond the scope of this Article.
165. For an early discussion on administrative law as a mechanism for vindicating due
process, see generally Bernard Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative Law, 25
N.Y.U. L. REV. 552 (1950).
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statutory requirements, agencies can ensure that abstract terms such as "cost"
and "value" are appropriately defined without hamstringing private actors or
undermining the efficiency of the delegation. We also think that the content
of contracts can be designed to protect individual rights while providing
agencies and their partners with sufficient flexibility so that they are not
compelled to recontract every time circumstances (or technologies) change.
The final focal point concerns enforcement. A contract is only as good as
its execution, but the question most relevant to administrative lawyers should
be, "who has the legal right to enforce the contract?" Obviously, the agency
and its partners have a series of obligations and duties the breach of which
could expose one or the other to liability. But agencies exist to effectuate the
law of the land, and much of this law relates to individual rights. We suggest
that the doctrine of third-party beneficiaries may have some application here.
For instance, an administrative statute could endow a welfare recipient with
standing to sue a private food-stamp processor for breach of contract. Or an
inmate could be authorized to prosecute an action against a prison
management corporation for the torts and deprivations brought about by its
employees. Our statutory framework would establish a robust cause of action
to vindicate righteous third-party claims., 66 The following Subparts explicate
our framework in detail.
A. FORMATION
1. The Decision to Outsource
When an agency first confronts the possibility that a private partner may
be equipped to deliver better (or cheaper) human services than the agency
itself could do, important decisions must be made. First, what are the
problems that the agency is trying to solve? Is the agency merely after cheaper
service, or does market competition bring with it a greater possibility of
innovation as well? Second, who should be authorized to make the initial
decision to outsource? The commissioner? A separate panel of decision
makers within the agency? Stakeholders in the public sector? A mix of these
individuals and positions? Do we need a process that involves multiple groups
and input early on? 67
We here submit that, from the very outset, the public should have an
opportunity to weigh in on the formation of, if not any public-private
agreement, then certainly a human-service contract as characterized in Part
166. We recognize, of course, that authorizing litigation begets litigation. Our goal is
certainly not to flood the courts. But we think that the costs of human-service contracts in the
status quo-the depoliticization, the democracy deficit, the commodification of human beings-
warrant additional avenues forjudicial review. We explore this tension further in Part IVA, infra.
167. Professor Aman has elsewhere suggested that "[t]he basic decision to outsource a
governmental program is, in and of itself, a significant one and procedural opportunities to question
the wisdom of that basic decision should also be provided in a timely way, quite apart from an analysis
of the details of the actual outsourcing contract involved." Aman, supra note 13o, at 418.
g917
IOWA LAW REVIEW
II.B. The commissioner or a body authorized to act on behalf of the agency
may commence the outsourcing venture, but they should do so only after
notifying the public and inviting comment. i68
2. Competitive Bidding
The decision to outsource isjust the first in a series of steps agencies must
perform in order to ensure fair and transparent contracting. Under our
framework, agencies must employ a consistent, standards-driven approach to
awarding human-service contracts. Outsourcing decisions that exceed a
certain monetary threshold would be subject to a competitive bidding
process. 69 And within any given regulatory field, caps would be imposed on
the extent to which a single firm can acquire market share. Our framework
would disallow private monopolies operating in the public sphere.
Although competitive bidding obviously involves cost considerations, the
competition we seek to engender is broader and more robust. Firms vying for
market share in the private prison industry, for instance, could draw attention
not only to their low-cost services but also to their success rate in reducing
recidivism. Firms proposing public-private infrastructure for welfare
administration could highlight their superior track record in customer
service. And because, in addition to competitive bidding, we also propose
heightened public participation in the contracting process, 7 o public
stakeholders would have an opportunity to help contracting agencies
determine which criteria should be treated as dispositive for any given
outsourcing venture.
Current law provides for some accountability in contracting. At the
federal level, for instance, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
("OFPP"), housed within the OMB, issues policy guidelines and memoranda
"to provide overall direction for government-wide procurement policies,
168. Indiana's welfare privatization project, discussed in supra Part H.B.5 , provides a helpful
illustration of how not to undertake an outsourcing project. In particular, Professor Aman notes:
The question of whether to outsource [welfare] modernizing tasks to a private
provider was never aired publicly. Whether new technologies could, in effect, be
insourced to the government rather than contracted out to the private sector was a
question that could have benefitted from public discussion before the decision to
outsource was made. Nor was the question of whether these types of reforms were
worth pursuing, given the complexity and diverse nature of the makeup of the welfare
applicant pool.
Aman, supra note 13o, at 400. Although Indiana's governor did appoint an interagency review
committee to study the proposal submitted by IBM, no public hearings were held-and neither
actual welfare recipients nor their public-interest advocates were given a meaningful opportunity
to weigh in. Id.
169. The precise monetary threshold is not important for purposes of this discussion. Our
point is simply that some relatively modest dollar figure should separate substantial contracts that
warrant heightened scrutiny from minor arrangements that may operate in the background.
170. See infra Part HI.A.3 .
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regulations and procedures and to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in acquisition processes."71 Certain agencies have advertising
and competitive bidding requirements included in their enabling acts, while
others have promulgated such requirements through regulations.'17 And
Title 41 of the United States Code-concerning public contracts-establishes
a broad requirement that executive agencies "in conducting a procurement
for property or services shall ... obtain full and open competition through
the use of competitive procedures."s73 Some states impose similar
requirements.
But these seemingly robust requirements are swallowed by their
numerous exceptions. Take the competitive bidding requirement of Title 41,
for instance. The Code authorizes noncompetitive procedures where, inter alia,
the property/services required by an agency are available from only one
responsible source; the agency's need for property/services is urgent; or the
head of the agency determines that noncompetitive procedures are in the
"public interest."174 Or take those many federal agencies that lack their own
organic procedural statutes: they are governed by the APA, and the APA says
nary a word about competitive bidding.
Human-service contracts are precisely the types of agreements for which
candor and transparency are most essential. Moreover, these sensitive services
require special expertise: before signing a contract, a firm should be required
to demonstrate that it has the requisite expertise. Competitive bidding helps
to ensure that government's private partners are the best parties for the job.
171. Office ofFederal Procurement Policy, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/procurementdefault (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
172. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 414.406 (2016) (establishing competitive bidding procedures at
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services for certain durable medical equipment
acquisitions); 47 C.F.R. § 1.21003 (2016) (establishing competitive bidding procedures at the
Federal Communication Commission for universal service support mechanisms).
173. 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1) (2012).
174. Id. § 3304(a); see also s PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICKJ. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER &
O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2.39 (2002) ("Public agencies are accorded broad
discretion in determining whether competitive bidding is 'feasible' and 'practicable' under the
circumstances, and usually have the authority to waive competitive bidding when doing so is
clearly in the 'public interest.' At the federal level, this 'catch all' exemption applies generally to
any 'public interest,' such as maintenance of a strong industrial base, implementation of
international treaties, confidentiality of proprietary information, national security, and
standardization and interchangeability of specialized technical equipment." (footnotes
omitted)); 64 AM.JUR. 2d PUBLICWORKSAND CONTRACTS § 32 (2016) ("[C]ontracts for services,
particularly for professional services and other services requiring special training and skill, are
generally not contemplated by provisions requiring public contracts for work to be let upon
competitive bidding."); Moye, supra note 49, at 307-09 (recounting President Barack Obama's
criticisms of increasing federal reliance on sole-source contracts and outsourcing).
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3. Notice and Comment
Once an agency has decided to outsource and has at least preliminarily
selected a private partner, but before any final agreements are reduced to
writing, stakeholders and members of the public should have an opportunity
to weigh in once more. Generally speaking, and to the extent feasible, our
framework would hold human-service contracts to the same procedural
requirements as notice-and-comment rulemaking: that is to say, the content
of these contracts (or at least the core provisions) 75 would be available for
public review at individual agency websites or, perhaps, a general internet
clearinghouse. 7 6 Agencies would be obligated to solicit, consider, and
respond to public input.
In this way, the democracy deficit that inheres in shadowy public-private
partnerships would be cured or at least offset,'77 and agencies that are so often
focused on the financial bottom line would be required to consider and
engage with the broader array of factors that inform a human-service
contract-the same broader array of factors that we contemplate figuring into
the competitive bidding process more prominently and explicitly.
A notice-and-comment requirement admittedly would slow the process
of contracting in at least some circumstances, but notice-and-comment is
hardly a high hurdle for agencies to vault: it is "elegantly simple."78 Modest
procedure would make public-private partnerships more accountable, more
democratic-and more likely to accommodate the needs of the ultimate
beneficiaries of human-service contracts.
B. TERMS
1. Definitions and Standards
Agencies contract-in large part-to reduce costs.79 But what constitutes
"cost?" The definition seems critical: if left open to interpretation, contractors
175. We recognize, of course, that confidentiality concerns may weigh against publishing
some of the details of ongoing negotiations. For instance, trade secrets and specific price points
might be kept private at these early stages of a public-private partnership. Conversely, some
subjects absolutely should be raised at the notice-and-comment stage: agencies should be clear,
for example, about precisely what is and what is not being outsourced. Will the contractor simply
perform a task previously performed by the agency (or another contractor)? Or is the contractor
proposing to innovate or fundamentally alter the way a service is delivered?
176. Such a clearinghouse could provide essential information about human-service
contracts across multiple agencies in a convenient, digestible format-akin to Regulations.gov.
177. "A democracy deficit ... occurs when public functions are carried out by private actors
to the extent that requirements of transparency and public participation-the keystones of
administrative democracy-are reduced or set aside." Aman, supra note 52, at 87.
178. Aman, supra note 7, at 417.
179. "Cost considerations are not limited solely to costs incurred by the regulated. Government
costs also have risen, and agency budgets have declined, making new, cost-effective ways to achieve
public interest ends increasingly important" Id. at 413.
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may be free to construe "cost" in strictly economic terms and to roll back
services in an effort to shore up the bottom line. Of course, nothing prevents
agencies from imposing a more complete understanding of "cost" through
their contracts. But agencies themselves may be susceptible to the prevailing
narrative of economic austerity. We cannot count on courts to intervene and
reorder the agencies' priorities: as Skidmore,so Chevron,,8l and progeny teach,
courts are hesitant to interject their own judgment when agencies reasonably
interpret ambiguous language in the statutes they are charged with
administering. 182
So if we want human-service contractors to adopt a multifaceted
definition of "cost" and to think beyond strict budgetary considerations, it is
incumbent upon Congress and state legislatures to make those other values
explicit. Which commitments must agencies require of their private partners?
And which benchmarks must those partners achieve in order to remain in
compliance?
When the DoD outsources under current law, it is required to consider
several factors in addition to cost-including quality, reliability, and
timeliness.5 s These terms are not defined in Title io, and one could imagine
i8o. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We consider that the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such ajudgment in
a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.").
181. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
182. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) ("Chevron... provides a
stable background rule against which Congress can legislate: Statutory ambiguities will be
resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the
administering agency. Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe,
and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion." (citation omitted)); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("[A]dministrative implementation of a
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.");
see also Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA and the Scope ofJudicial Review: Importing Chevron into State
Administrative Law, 20 WIDENER L.J. 8oi, 8o (2011) (recognizing that, while state courts have
not rushed to incorporate Chevron deference into their own agency review doctrines, Chevron has
influenced some state courts, and "several [of these] courts apply strikingly similar standards").
183. 10 U.S.C. § 2461 (a)(1)(D) (2012).
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a court granting substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of
"quality," but the terms represent at least a congressional effort to prevent the
DoD from narrowly focusing on the bottom line. Not so with many other
federal and state agencies, where outsourcing criteria are nonspecific or
wholly reserved to agency discretion.
Our statutory framework would require agencies to provide clear
definitions in each human-service contract, giving precise content to
ambiguous terms such as "cost." And because of the notice-and-comment
procedures we would require at both the launch of an outsourcing venture
and immediately before a final agreement is integrated, those definitions
would be properly subject to public scrutiny.
2. Liability
As discussed in Part II.B.1, constitutional law offers little practical relief
for the victims of torts committed by agency delegates. There is no Bivens
remedy as against federal contractors,'8 4 and state contractors are protected
by strict mens rea standards for many constitutional claims85 and a generally
recognized extension of Monell's bar on respondeat superior liability for
private, for-profit organizations.
Meanwhile, welfare recipients rely on private bureaus to approve and
disburse their benefits; inmates depend on commercial-sector security teams
to protect them from violence; children attend charter schools, private police
and fire departments provide essential services,'86 and cities spin off utilities
they formerly owned and operated. In the morass of public-private
partnerships and delegations, mistakes are inevitably made-and the victims
of these mistakes should have some means of redress.
Absent movement from the courts on, for instance, the Monell question,
contracts-constrained and governed by the statutory framework that we are
proposing-could help to ensure that private service providers, like the
defendant medical contractor in Shields v. Illinois Department of Corrections,,87
184. See supra note 75.
185. It is difficult, for example, for a private prisoner to assert and prove that he is the victim
of deliberately indifferent acts of cruelty. Deliberate indifference is not an impossible threshold
to overcome, but it is an onerous one.
186. See generaluy THE IAW ENF'T-PRIvATE SEC. CONSORTIUM, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE: OFFICE OF
CMTY. ORIENTED POLIcING SERVs., OPERATION PARTNERSHIP- TRENDS AND PRACrCES IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURnY COLLABORATIONS (2oog), http://www.ilj.org/publications/
docs/Operation PartneshipPrivate Security.pdf; Radley Balko, Massachusetts SWAT Teams Claim
They're Pivate Corporations, Immune from Open Records Laws, WASH. POST (June 26, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpostcom/news/the-watch/wp/201 4 /06/26/massachusett-swat-teams-claim-theyre-
pivate-corporations-immune-from-open-records-laws; William Glaberson, Experiment in Private Fre
Protection Failsfora Westchester Village, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/
13/nyregion/experiment-in-private-fire-protection-fails-for-a-westchester-vilage.html.
187. Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3 d 782 (7th Cir. 2014); see also supra notes 69-79
and accompanying text
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are exposed to liability when their employees violate the civil rights of third
parties. Under our approach, private prisons, welfare bureaus, and other
classes of contractors would answer for the constitutional torts of their
employees, regardless of whether the organizations themselves maintain
unconstitutional policies or customs. Moreover, they would answer for acts of
gross negligence, in the same manner that private companies answer for their
employees' torts at common law.,88 Respondeat superior has every bit as much
relevance in the context of human-service contracting as it does in ordinary
business dealings, and arguably more given the gravity of the interests at stake:
if a customer can recover against a business for the fraudulent acts of its
employees or for injuries sustained from a slip-and-fall or a malfunctioning
product, then vulnerable prisoners injured while incarcerated and welfare
recipients whose benefits are unjustifiably terminated should certainly have a
reliable avenue for judicial relief.
3. Duration, Revision, and Novation
Imposing durational limits on contracts may in some instances
encourage contractors to respect human rights-if not out of moral
obligation, then out of sound business sense. In a case concerning the
privatization of prisons in Tennessee, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the limited duration of Tennessee's prison contracts and the power
of that state to cancel at any time after the first year of operation. Writing for
the Court, Justice Breyer observed:
Competitive pressures mean not only that a firm whose guards are
too aggressive will face damages that raise costs, thereby
threatening its replacement, but also that a firm whose guards are
too timid will face threats of replacement by other firms with
records that demonstrate their ability to do both a safer and a
more effective job. 8 9
Under our statutory framework, human-service contracts would either:
(i) include default sunset dates (with options to renew based on
performance); or (2) authorize contracting agencies to reevaluate the efficacy
of long-term contracts after a certain, modest period of time has elapsed.
Contracts bound by our framework would also include terms that authorize
early termination or modification in case of substantial breach or a material
change in circumstances. So long as private contractors are aware of these
188. Certainly, the victims of contractor torts may have a remedy under some state tort regimes
in the status quo. However, these regimes vary wildly in, for instance, the statutes of limitation they
impose, their caps on damages, and whether public-private partnerships are shielded under common-
law principles of sovereign immunity. We envision a more unifonn-and generous-regime to ensure
that tort victims have ample opportunity for recovery and are protected from "the vagaries of the laws
of the several States." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (198o).
189. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409 (1997).
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terms and restrictions up front, there is no need for concern about
unconstitutional contract impairment: private parties can account for the risk
of change through arms-length bargaining, and agencies will be protected in
the event that they exercise their statutorily guaranteed rights to terminate or
modify.,o
4. Freedom of Information
The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),'9' along with its many state-
law counterparts,192 requires agencies to publish substantive/procedural rules
and organizational information; release adjudicative opinions, policy
statements, administrative materials, and other documents for public
inspection; and make "reasonable efforts" to search for requested records and
deliver them in any "readily reproducible" form or format requested. FOIA is
lengthy, and it features a variety of procedural requirements, governing
everything from fee schedules,93 to tracking and information-management
systems'94 to judicial enforcement where agencies fail to comply with their
obligations.195
FOIA also expressly defines the class of agencies to which it applies. FOIA
covers "any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in
the executive branch of the Government ... or any independent regulatory
agency."'96 From that definition, it appears that FOIA does not apply to
private-sector firms carrying out governmental responsibilities. In fact, the
case law in this area is somewhat more nuanced than the statutory language
19o. The proposed EU Model Rules include similar provisions, authorizing the EU authority
to override contract terms in good faith through its exercise of public-authority powers and
allowing for termination by either party in situations involving: (i) material changes of
circumstances; (2) risk of "grave harm to the common good"; (3) nonperformance; (4)
procedural violations that harm a third party; or (5) contractual illegality. See AUBY ET AL., supra
note 162, at 166, 169-71.
191. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) [hereinafter "FOIA").
192. State Freedom of Information Laws, NAT'L FREEDOM INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/
state-freedom-of-information-laws (last visited Jan. 5, 2017); see also generally Charles N. Davis et al.,
Sunshine Laws andfJudicial Discretion: A Proposalfor Refonn of State Sunshine Law Enforcement Proseions, 28
URB. LAW. 41 (1996); Aimee Edmondson & Charles N. Davis, "Prisoners" of Private Industry: Economic
Development and State Sunshine Laws, 16 COMM. L & POL'Y 317 (2011); Michael W. Field, Rhode Island's
Access to Public Records Act: An Application Gone Awry, 8 ROGER WILIAMS U. L. REV. 293 (2oo3); Alyssa
Harmon, Note, Illinois's Freedom of Information Act: More Access or More Hurdles ?, 33 N. ILL U. L. REV. 6o1
(2013); Cassandra B. Roeder, Note, Transparency Trumps Technology: Reconciling Open Meeting Laws with
Modern Technology, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2287 (2014). For brevity in this section, we focus primarily
on the law of FOIA proper, but our analysis could easily extend to many similar-and similarly
construed--state laws.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iv).
194. Id.§552(a)(7).
195. Id. § 552(a) (4) (B).
196. Id.§ 5 5 2(f)(1).
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would suggest,'97 but many private contractors have successfully avoided the
spotlight of FOIA. The problem is amplified in the private-prison sector,
where, "[d]espite consistent attempts to apply FOIA to the industry ... tens
of thousands of individuals incarcerated by the federal government are in
facilities beyond the reach of this form of oversight."',9
The documents and memoranda that agencies generate in the process of
receiving bids for private contracts and structuring deals could fall within
FOIA's domain-but such information could also be characterized as exempt
from disclosure under section 5 5 2(b) (4) "'9
Transparency and accountability rank high on any list of potential
concerns relating to privatization, and administrative-law scholars have
criticized the transparency deficit as agencies increasingly rely on private
partners.2 " Professors Cate, Fields, and McBain noted that FOIA has at least
197. Courts have in some cases extended FOIA to private corporations acting under
governmental control. See Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (treating the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as an agency under FOIA); cf Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding
that a contractor foundation was notan agency under FOIA). In other cases, courts have extended
FOIA to private corporations that assume functional equivalence with federal agencies. See Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (treating the Office of Science and Technology
as an agency under FOIA); cf Wash. Research Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
504 F.2d 238, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that advisory committees serving the NIMHwere not
agencies under FOIA). In cases in which an entity is not deemed to be an agency for FOIA
purposes, its records may still be subject to the law if they constitute "agency records," a term that
appears in, but is not specifically defined by, FOIA. However, the agency-records exception is a
nonstarter for many private entities: "the Supreme Court has established that an agency must
have custody and control of records to create a sufficient nexus for a finding of agency record
status." Nicole B. Cisarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The
Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 249, 280 (1995). Thus, internal
records stored on secure servers at, for instance, CCA or GEO Group detention centers are
unlikely to fall within the four corners of FOIA.
198. Mike Tartaglia, Note, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1689, 1738-39
(2014).
199. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)( 4 )(B) (exempting FOIA's applicability to "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential").
But cf Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989, 999 (2005) ("Private companies are free from
the disclosure obligations placed on the government by the FOIA, the federal law intended to
make democracy work by ensuring access to all of the government's information compatible with
security. There is some authority that private companies enjoy the ability to enjoin the
government from disclosing information they have shared with the government in the course of
doing business together." (footnote omitted)).
200. Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507,
1554 (2001) ("Privatization threatens to undermine the accountability provided by the APA and
FOIA in several ways, some obvious and some not so obvious. Most obviously, insofar as a private
entity is not subject to the APA or FOIA, the accountability advantages of those statutes are lost. ...
Private companies developing rules of thumb for dealing with claims or other matters affecting the
public might not have to publish those rules under the APA, and the lack of public access to their
records and meetings might make it difficult for the public to even know of such rules' existence.").
Professor Fenster pointed to a particular irony at the intersection of privatization and freedom of
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three core functions: (1) it empowers the public to serve as a "watchdog" over
governmental officials; (2) it assures public access to agency information
concerning public policy; and (3) it prevents agencies from creating or
enforcing laws in secret.20o Each of these valuable goals is undercut when
agencies delegate governmental power to entities excluded from FOIA's
coverage.
In an influential 1999 article, Professor Craig Feiser asserted that "in an
age of privatization of governmental services in the name of efficiency,
[FOIA] needs to be adapted to ensure that its original purpose remains
sound."202 Feiser rejected narrow interpretations/extensions of the statute,
and argued instead that "if the records pertain to the government, they are of
interest to the public and should be opened for scrutiny," regardless of
whether the government controls those records in a technical sense and
regardless of whether the private entity that holds them is acting as the
functional equivalent of the government.2 05
Professor Jack Beermann agreed that it is possible to maintain
accountability and transparency in a world of government-by-contract:
Perhaps courts should deem any rules ... developed by a private
contractor to be rules of the agency and apply the APA's publication
requirement. Agencies also should provide clear instructions to
private providers of government benefits, and should not allow the
private companies to make discretionary decisions that, if made by
an agency, would be subject to the APA and FOIA's accountability
enhancing procedures.204
Rather than relying on courts to construe FOIA and its state equivalents
broadly, our framework would amend these laws to treat human-service
contractors like official agencies for freedom-of-information purposes. If
there is legitimate concern that critical business data could be exposed,
legislatures could expand their trade-secrets exemptions to ensure that these
exemptions cover the internal financial reports and other confidential
documents pertaining to the per se business operations of human-service
contractors. But to the extent that these contractors seek to conceal records
of genuine interest to the public-concerning health and safety, systemic IT
problems, or complaints and enforcement actions by third-party
information: "[F]ederal agencies have begun to contract out their own responses to FOIA
requests-leading inevitably to the issue of whether records produced by the private firms engaged
in reviewing FOIA requests would themselves be subject to FOIA." Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWAL. REV. 885,919 (2oo6) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
201. Fred H. Cate et al., TheRight to Privacy and thePublic's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose"
of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1994).
202. Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis ofPublic Access
to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 62 (1999).
203. Id.
204. Beermann, supra note 200, at 1555 (footnote omitted).
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beneficiaries-the trade-secrets exemptions should provide no cover, and
freedom-of-information statutes should guarantee more open government.
C. ENFORCEMENT
It seems almost tautological to assert that effective contracts require
effective enforcement mechanisms. Parties covenant to perform certain tasks
according to delineated standards; where parties fail to perform, or where
their efforts are subpar, they face legal consequences.
But because the APA and many state procedural laws impose no uniform
requirements for the kinds of enforcement mechanisms agencies must
include in their contracts, those decisions are essentially left to the agencies
themselves, influenced as they are by the narrative of austerity that informs so
much of contemporary realpolitik.2os
For purposes of our statutory framework, we have conceived of three
possibilities to ensure consistent and robust enforcement. First, as suggested
above, establishing contracts of limited duration (with the opportunity for
renewal if outcomes are favorable) may encourage private-party compliance.
This approach, by itself, is probably insufficient, but it does have the decided
benefit of coaxing self-enforcement: firms want to retain their lucrative
government contracts, and so they have an economic motivation to comply.2o
Second, third-party auditors may be appropriate in a variety of
circumstances. For example, public-policy activities done by the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") "might be duplicated by private-group
certification of the private delivery of social services." o7 Theoretically, these
auditors-disinterested parties with a public-interest mandate-could
evaluate both the efficacy of outsourcing in general and the quality of
particular services delivered (i.e., is the contractor performing up to snuff?).
Red flags could be raised as needed before the appropriate agency officials,
and, potentially-depending on the gravity of the breach-before the public
at large.20 8
Third, we think it may be helpful to characterize the ultimate recipients
of public-private human services as third-party contract beneficiaries of sorts.
The term "beneficiaries" may seem a bit peculiar, given that many of those on
205. Mary E. Harney, The Quiet Revolution: Downsizing, Outsourcing, and Best Value, 158 MIL.
L. REV. 4 8, 5 2 n.1 5 (1999)-
2o6. Whereas if the duration of a contract is indefinite, a firm with a reasonable risk appetite
might "roll the dice" on some minor breaches, figuring either that (1) the agency will not notice
or (2) the agency is unlikely to trouble itself with the hassle and litigation surrounding contract
termination unless the breach is extraordinary.
207. AMAN, supra note 5, at 151.
208. While minor discrepancies could probably be resolved in-house, the public has the
right and the responsibility to know when human rights are harmed by public agencies or their
private agents. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of various human-service contracts and the
abuses that have occurred where monitoring has failed or where dignitary expectations were
never very clear in the first place.
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the receiving end of human-service contracts are unwilling recipients: federal
prisoners and immigration detainees, as well as homeless persons and welfare
recipients who are no doubt grateful for the aid they receive but who surely
would prefer a more stable, self-sustaining situation.
But our point is that these vulnerable parties are the very persons whose
rights are jeopardized in the status quo and who would benefit most directly
from a reboot of administrative procedure. Regardless of the circumstances
that caused them to rely on government or government-sponsored services,
here they are-and if we statutorily empower them to fight back when
contractors breach, they can help enforce public-private agreements broadly
even as they vindicate their rights individually.os
We suspect that contractors would fall quickly in line if they knew that
not only government officials but also the prisoner in need of surgery or the
single parent in need of SNAP benefits could take them to task for their failure
to comply with their contract's letter and/or spirit.
IV. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
A. OPENING THE FLOODGATES?
The framework we have just laid out would, we think, fill hazardous gaps
in the APA and its state equivalents, preserving agency flexibility in this
complex, emerging global era, while simultaneously ensuring that basic
human rights and democratic principles are not undercut in the name of
efficiency. We think our approach would work well with the types of human-
service contracts we described in Part II, and quite possibly with other such
contracts that we have not explicitly addressed.
But we recognize that our proposal, like any effort to address a complex
problem, is an imperfect one. Perhaps the most obvious concern relates to
our recommendations for expanded respondeat superior liability, as stated in
Part III.B.2, and third-party contract enforcement, as stated in Part III.C. We
anticipate a counterargument: isn't it unwise to burden the courts,
overwhelmed as their dockets are, with a new class of litigants emboldened by
209. In his article on Indiana's failed welfare privatization experiment, Professor Aman
proposed just such a third-party enforcement scheme, suggesting that "[c]ontracts between
private companies and states could recognize welfare recipients as third-party beneficiaries to the
contract to allow recipients legal redress when private contractors violate the terms of the contract
in a way that results in the unlawful deprivation of benefits." Aman, supra note 130, at 419-20.
Professor Aman noted the irony of a politically hypersensitive, unprecedented arrangement the
enforcement of which the state alone could pursue: "Given the diverse interests at stake and the
state's desire to have its contract work as efficiently as possible, it might not be as willing to
challenge the contractor as those whose benefits are very much on the line." Id. at 420. Our
proposal here extends Professor Aman's earlier recommendation: any recipient of a human-
service contract benefit should have: (1) standing to file an administrative grievance or, if
necessary, a lawsuit; (2) a statutorily authorized cause of action for breach; and (3) clearly defined
contract remedies, perhaps including specific performance for those contracts that cannot be
easily unwound or re-delegated.
928 [Vol. io2:883
2017] THE HUMAN SLDE OFPUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
fresh statutory causes of action? And isn't it particularly unwise to arm
prisoners and detainees with such tools, given the inherently litigious position
they occupy (i.e., few limits on their time and relatively little to lose)?21o
We have two responses to these reasonable concerns. First, if contractors
are aware that they can no longer hide behind the guise of privity, immunity,
Monell's constraint on respondeat superior, Minneci's limitation on the Bivens
remedy, or any of the other mechanisms they presently employ to avoid
liability and to dodge their contractual responsibilities, they are likely to be
more conscientious with respect to the policies they implement, the
employees they hire and train, and the activities they undertake. Simply put:
placing liability on the table will ensure that all comers have the correct
incentives to perform theirjobs with the upmost care-and a statutory regime
with clearly defined standards and remedies is far superior to the vagaries of
state tort law or whatever inchoate theories litigants are forced to fall back on
in the status quo.
Moreover, the type of liability we are describing here is really not so far
removed from the common law. Judge Hamilton made this point in Shields, as
he challenged the prevailing notion that Monell should protect private
corporations from section 1983 actions on the basis of employee conduct:
Perhaps the most important criticism to emerge ... is that Monell
failed to grapple with the fact that respondeat superior liability for
employers was a settled feature of American law that was familiar to
Congress in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted. Congress therefore
enacted § 1983 against the backdrop of respondeat superior liability
and presumably assumed that courts would apply it in claims against
corporations under § 1983.211
Private corporations should answer for the conduct and malfeasance of
their employees, and agents of the public's business (whether governmental
agencies proper or private-sector stand-ins) should answer to the public.
B. ELEVATED COSTS UNDERMINE EFFECTIVE DELEGATIONS?
Another counterargument we anticipate: won't the cost of heightened
process and procedure (and exposure to putative liability) deter contractors
from signing on with government partners in the first instance? And won't
such deterrence undermine the flexibility that is so critical to 21st-century
governance (particularly in states with chronic budget shortfalls)?
The costs that our statutory framework would impose might discourage
some private actors from signing on to agency contracts, at least on the
210. Indeed, this was the primary argument that prompted Congress to enact the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of i996 ("AEDPA"), which significantly rolled back
the procedural rights and remedies available to federal habeas petitioners. SeeAntiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
211. Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F-3 d 782, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2014).
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margins. But we do not think this argument poses a serious hurdle, for two
reasons. First, there is significant money to be made in the public-private
industry. Consider private prisons, for instance. In 2010, CCA enjoyed record
revenues of $1.67 billion, while GEO Group brought in $1.27 billion.212 The
welfare administration industry is lucrative as well. Indiana's current eight-
year contract with ACS is worth $638 million,2'3 while a contract with
Accenture to manage Texas's CHIP program and Medicaid/SNAP call
centers was once valued at $899 million.214 After a series of training and
technical "snafus," Texas canceled the contract-$244 million in.215 Tim
Dowd, a market-research executive, estimated that state outsourcing
amounted to $8.8 billion in 2oo9-and that it would rise five percent annually
thereafter.2, 6 So to whatever extent our proposal might raise costs, the
extraordinary financial benefits of dealing with the government will likely
remain persuasive for many putative contractors.2 17
Second, to the extent that traditional for-profit entities exit the market
in the face of increasing process and costs, nonprofit or public-benefit entities
may fill the gaps. If we are genuinely concerned about the preservation of
human dignity and individual rights, perhaps this transition would not be
such a bad thing. Public-benefit corporations in particular are making waves
in statehouses across the nation;- 8 these entities seem ideally situated to carry
out the public's business (and prioritize philanthropic values) while still
turning a reasonable profit for their shareholders.2"9
212. JUSTICE PoLY INsT., GAMING THE SYSTEM: How THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE
PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIvE INCARCERATION POLICIES 1-2 (2011), http://wwwjustice
policy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming-the-system - executive.summary.pdf.
213. Gold et al., supra note 135.
214. Aman Batheja, In State Contracting Failure Is an option, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2015, 6:oo
AM), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/02/o1/cost-overruns-and-bungles-state-contracting.
215. Id.
216. William M. Bulkeley, Glitches Mar Indiana's Effort to Outsource Social Services, WALL STREETJ.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125003802691324435 (last updated Aug. 12, 2oog, 12:01 AM).
217. For that matter, there is an argument that some added costs to internalize the
effectiveness and fairness of privatization might strengthen public-private partnerships in the
long haul, ensuring their viability (which in turn redounds to the benefit of the contractors).
218. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Delaware 'Public Benefit Corporation' Lets Directors Serve Three Masters
Instead of One, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 2:o6 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2s3/
07/16/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-lets-directors-serve-three-masters-instead-of-one; Jack
Markell, A New Kind of Corporation to Harness the Power of Private Enterprise for Public Benefat, HUFFINGTON
POST: BLOG, http://www.huffingtonpostcom/govjack-markell/public-benefit-corporation-b_36357
52.html (last updated Sept. 21, 2013); see also State ty State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visitedJan. 5, 2017).
219. Public-benefit corporations are creatures of recent legislation, and not much scholarly
attention has been paid to them to date. For a helpful overview of these hybrid entities, see
generally Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How To Enforce a Mandate To Promote the
Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (2012). Cummings describes public-benefit corporations
as entities with "double bottom lines":
[D]ouble bottom line corporations neither treat social responsibility as incidental
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C. DUPLICATIVE LEGISLATION?
As discussed throughout this Article, our statutory framework-though it
was inspired by deficits in the APA as applied in today's socioeconomic and
political climate-is designed to function at state and federal levels alike. State
outsourcing is big business, and some of the human-service contracts that
most concern us (principally private prisons, welfare administration, and
provision for the homeless) are largely the province of state rather than
federal law.
But one might argue that not all state-level administrative procedure laws
are as impoverished as the federal APA with respect to contracting and public-
private partnerships. In Massachusetts, for instance, a general statute
authorizing privatization employs "multiple rationales for privatizing, and
seeks to elicit the reasons and goals of the privatization proposal under
consideration prior to authorization."22o The statute candidly recognizes that
"using private contractors to provide public services formerly provided by
state employees does not always promote the public interest."221
Ohio's prison-privatization statute increases accountability and
opportunities for public input by providing that contracts "shall be for an
initial term [of not more than two years], with an option to renew for
additional periods of two years."222 Tennessee requires private prisons to
"agree that the state may cancel the contract at any time after the first year of
operation, without penalty to the state, upon giving ninety (go) days' written
notice."223 And the District of Columbia monitors outsourcing through its
Office of Contracting and Procurement ("OCP").224
But other states maintain a more permissive view of contracting.
Colorado provides a helpful illustration: its stated policy, adopted in response
to a constitutional amendment that constrained government activities, is "to
to profit-making ... nor see profit-making as incidental to the pursuit of social
welfare objectives.. . . Instead they seek to serve two "co-equal" masters (two bottom
lines) at once-to "expressly measure[] [their] success both in terms of [their]
financial performance ... and [their] success in advancing a social mission."
Id. at 581-82 (footnotes omitted) (third omission in original) (alterations in internal quote
found in original).
220. Aman, supra note 16, at 272 (emphasis added).
221. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 52 (2014).
222. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 9.o6(A) (1) (West 2016).
223. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-24-104(a) (4) (2014).
224. The Office of Contracting and Procurement ("OCP") coordinates procurement
activities within the District and reviews, monitors, and audits these activities. D.C. CODE
§ 2-352.04 (2001). Contractors must meet a set of baseline standards, including satisfactory
records of performance/integrity and adequate financial resources to perform under the
proposed contract. Id. § 2-353.01. Competitive bidding is governed by rules customized to the
type of contact under consideration: "emergency procurements" and "human care
procurements" are subject to special rules and guidelines. Id. H§ 2-354.05 to 2-354.o6.
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encourage the use of private contractors for personal services to achieve
increased efficiency in the delivery of government services.""25
Similarly, West Virginia and Montana both have prison-privatization
statutes expressing a legislative embrace of outsourcing. In West Virginia, the
legislature has found that: (1) "adequate and modern prison facilities are
essential to the safety and welfare of the people of this state and other states";
(2) "contracting for portions of governmental services is a viable alternative
for this state and its political subdivisions"; and (3) "allowing for the
establishment of private prison facilities is an economic development
opportunity for local communities and will augment the general revenue
fund."226 As for Montana, " [t] he state recognizes that there may be benefits to
confining convicted persons in private correctional facilities operated
consistently with public policy."227
Idaho has a statute authorizing private security forces to secure the
capitol building and the state supreme court.228 Oklahoma allows private
prison contracts to run for 50 years at a time, albeit subject to annual
appropriations.229 In California, state and municipal authorities are
constitutionally entitled "to contract with qualified private entities for
architectural and engineering services for all public works of improvement,"
with such entitlement extending "to all phases of project development
including permitting and environmental studies, rights-of-way services, design
phase services and construction phase services."23o And in Oregon, where
forestry is the lifeblood of the local economy,2 s' the State Forestry Department
is statutorily required to "[e]ncourage the use of private contractors,
consultants, [and] forestry extension programs."232
These statutes (and others like them) lead us to three conclusions: first,
that contracting at both state and federal levels is pervasive in contemporary
governance; second, thatjurisdictions vary wildly in the types of contracts they
contemplate and the limitations they impose; and third, that a uniform
approach to human-service contracting in particular has not been adopted
(or even, so far as we are aware, seriously proposed). Some states are certainly
225. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-50-501 (2016).
226. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2 5 -5 -2 (2013).
227. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-601 (2015).
228. IDAHO CODE § 67-1605 (2014).
229. OKIA. STAT. tit. 19, § 744 (2011). Perhaps more concerning, "[a] private contractor,
in implementing a contract pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall not be bound by state
laws or other legislative enactments which govern the appointment, qualifications, duties, salaries
or benefits ofjailers or other employees of the jail facilities." Id. § 744-J.
230. CAL. CONST. art XXII, § 1.
231. Keeping Oregon Forests Working, OREGONFORESTS.ORG, http://oregonforests.org/
content/forest-sector-economy (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) ("The forest sector contributes: $12.7
billion to Oregon's economy each year. More than 58,ooo living-wage jobs. 6.8% of Oregon's
total industrial output. Millions of dollars of tourism annually.").
232. OR. REV. STAT. § 526.710(5) (2015).
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ahead of the game, but others are lagging behind. At bottom, we suggest
nothing more than a simple framework to help bring order to the legislative
morass and to encourage effective reform.
V. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATiVE LAW
This Article has made bold recommendations for a new legal regime to
govern the public-private partnerships that are ubiquitous in contemporary
agency practice. We are calling for a 21st-century reboot of the APA and of
state administrative-procedure laws; more fundamentally, we are calling for
the active preservation of human rights through administrative law.
The arc we have constructed-from general-service contracts to human-
service contracts and contracts potentially beyond the scope of permissible
delegation-may help scholars and policymakers begin thinking more
intentionally about the implications of contemporary delegation. The
examples we supply in Part II.B represent categories of contracts in which
human services are significantly implicated, such as those involving prisons
and detention centers, welfare programs, or police and emergency-response
entities.
But the tapestry of public-private partnerships is intricate, interwoven
with countless iterations of hybrid relationships. Within the framework we
have proposed, there is ample space for additional scholarship and reflection.
Charter schools are another case in point. There is considerable legal
debate over whether and to what extent these entities are "public" at all.233
They are funded by the state but increasingly independent and (arguably to
their detriment) free of accountability and oversight. And while they provide
an essential service traditionally reserved to the state, they do not consistently
guarantee the constitutional rights afforded to public school students. In the
Ninth Circuit, for instance, only one of the seven states with legislation
authorizing charter schools guarantees that all federal rights apply to such
schools.234
Yet schools implicate a host of human-rights concerns. They are places of
compulsory learning, where students' vocational prospects and life chances
233. Compare Preston C. Green E et al., Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine:
Are the Rights of Students of Color Sufficiently Protected?, 18 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R & Soc.JusT. 253, 2 56 (2012)
("Because state authorizing statutes consistently define charter schools as 'public schools,' it would
appear that charter school students are entitled to constitutional protections." (footnotes omitted)),
with Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 59o F.3 d 8o6, 818 (gth Cir. 2oo) (finding
allegations "insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that [charter school] was a state actor and thus
acted under color of state law in taking the alleged [termination] actions").
234. "With the exception of Oregon, state legislatures [in Ninth Circuitjurisdictions] do not
compel charter schools to follow constitutional guidelines with respect to due process. California
and Idaho merely require potential charter school operators to disclose their disciplinary policies
in their initial charter application. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nevada do not even demand that
charter schools disclose their disciplinary policies at the time of application." Green et al., supra
note 233, at 272 (footnotes omitted).
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are largely defined by the quality of instruction and care they receive. Schools
provide food and emergency medical care for children. They provide
security-at least in theory-from outside threats, and protection-
optimistically-from abusive behavior in the halls and the schoolyard. And
schools engage in discipline and punishment as well, albeit without the
panoply of procedural protections available in the criminal-justice system.2 35
The principles we have articulated and the model statutory provisions we have
recommended could liven the debate concerning the delegation from state
departments of education to charter schools: like contracts for prisons or
welfare programs, contracts for schools should arguably be open to public
inspection and participation, with mandatory terms, built-in oversight
mechanisms, and enforcement by third-party beneficiaries (e.g., students,
parents, and teachers).
There is also space for reformation of governance-by-contract in
contemporary environmental initiatives. Urban communities are grappling
with the problem of brownfields (i.e., abandoned or underused real-property
sites, the redevelopment of which may be complicated by the presence of
contaminants). 236 The EPA estimates that there may be as many as 450,000
brownfields throughout the country, while some estimates suggest that there
are as many as five million acres of abandoned industrial sites nationwide.237
The problem is not merely aesthetic: brownfields raise urgent questions about
health, safety, and vitality in urban centers.
Yet municipalities, particularly those with large abandoned sites, often
lack the funds to clean and redevelop brownfields on their own. As one author
suggested, " [t] he best way to facilitate brownfields redevelopment may be for
public and private entities to work together through public-private
partnerships."s 8 But public-private redevelopment of brownfields could be a
tragically missed opportunity if the private financiers and developers are not
bound to contract terms that advance the public interest. The most lucrative
projects may not necessarily be the most edifying. Contracts that invite public
participation may lead to better outcomes, such as more green spaces, more
affordable housing, and mixed-use properties that meet the practical needs
of residents.
235. Ingraham ex rel. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 58o (1975).
236. Scott W. Brunner, Comment, Sharing the Green: Reformatting Wisconsin's Forgotten Green
Space Grant with aPublic-Private Partnership Design, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 309-10 (2011).
237. Oni N. Harton, Note, Indiana's BrownfieldsInitiatives:A VehicleforPursuingEnviwnmentaljusti
orfjust Blowing Smoke?41 IND. L. REv. 215,219 (2008); see also NAT'LAss'N. OF CT17., FEDERAL FUNDING
PROGRAMS FOR BROWNFIELDS AND ABANDONED SiTE REDEvELOPMENT: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: A
PRIMER FOR COUNIY OFFICIALS 3 (2o8), http://www.naco.org/sites/defaut/files/documents/SLU
Report%2o-%2oFederal%2oFunding%2oPrograms%2ofor%2oBrownfields% 2oand%2oAbandoned
%2oSite%2oRedevelopment.pdf.
238. Brunner, supra note 236, at 328.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"[W] hen government concerns itself with the stability of an industry it is
only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than the political
analogue."239
These words, penned by James Landis many decades ago, echo and
reverberate today, as federal and state agencies continually adapt and reform
their modes of governance. Like 21st-century firms, with their global supply
chains, their diffuse management structures, and their shift from ownership
to cooperation, modern agencies rely with ever-increasing urgency on
contracts and partnerships to perform a range of services, from those we think
of as banal to those that touch and concern the most sensitive aspects of our
society.
In the status quo, many agency actions-even those with significant
public ramifications-receive little public attention. This is true even at the
federal level, where one might reasonably expect a greater degree of interest
(given heightened public awareness of prominent federal agencies and the
potentially broad impact of their rulemaking) .24o But our assumption is that
opening the door to elevated public participation in human-service contract
formation would not necessarily burden agencies-because presumptively
fair and reasonable terms on the one hand, and public inertia on the other,
would likely temper aggressive participation. 241
239. LANDIS, supra note 4 , at 11-12.
240. A casual review at Regulations.gov of comment periods closing during the month
of November 2014 found zero comments submitted with respect to, inter alia, a National
Science Foundation inquiry regarding Big Data Regional Innovation Hubs, see Accelerating
the Big Data Innovation System, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document
?D=NSFFRDOC oooi-1370 (last visited Jan. 5, 2017); proposed amendments to exempt
certain DOI records from provisions of the Privacy Act, see Privacy Act; Systems of Records:
Exemption for the Insider Threat Program, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=DOI-2os 4 -ooo9-ooos (last visited Jan. 5, 2017); and a proposed EPA rule
authorizing retroactive approval of hazardous waste initiatives in Arkansas, see Hazardous
Waste Management Programs: Arkansas; Final Authorization of State-Initiated Changes and
Incorporation by Reference, Proposed Rule, REGULATIONS.GOv, https ://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=EPA-Ro6-RCRA-2012-ogg 3 -0002 (last visited Jan. 5, 2017). Of course, the
public is not always lackadaisical. A Fish and Wildlife Service proposal to list the African lion
as a threatened subspecies generated 384,056 comments as of November 2, 2014, see
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the African
Lion Subspecies as Endangered, RECULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D
=FWS-R 9 -ES-2012-OO2 5 -oool (last visited Jan. 5, 2017); and a proposed change to the
definition of "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act generated 1,128,1 15
comments, see Clean Water Act; Definitions: Waters of the United States, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-201 1-o88o-ooo i (last visited Jan.
5, 2016).
241. Conversely, if an agency proposes to do something egregious-say, contract away
significant rights and liberties or delegate excessive discretion to market actors-the public might
well respond, and agencies should be required to pause and reevaluate under such
circumstances.
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Ultimately, while our proposal, with its added procedural requirements,
would inevitably add some time and cost to delegation, we think the
depoliticization of important judgments, the deprivation of democratic
process, and the commodification of human beings in the status quo amply
justify some additional procedure. This is our vision of administrative law-as
more than the sum of its parts; as a vehicle to vindicate individual rights.
What we have proposed in this Article is a simple framework that federal
and state governments could weave into their administrative procedure
statutes-a series of checks and balances inspired by the core elements of
contract (formation, terms, and enforcement). The idea is not to impose a
rigid set of requirements on agencies: we understand that jurisdictions (and
their constituents) have different priorities, and we suspect that the adoption
of a framework like the one we are proposing would look different in different
parts of the country.2 42 We also understand that our framework is just that-a
framework. It is not a model statute. It surely has its downsides, and those are
worth probing.
But it could also be the beginning of a conversation. What we hope our
Article has conveyed, above all, is a sense of urgency for administrative law to
address the democracy deficit and the commodification of human beings
brought about by increased and relatively unrestrained human-service
contracting. Where injured prisoners are left without remedies;43 where the
welfare benefits of our neediest citizens are arbitrarily terminated;244 where
immigrants are deported without process; 245 and when the homeless are left
to fend for themselves,24 6 our society has a problem that requires prompt
correction.
242. We think the timing of our proposal may be particularly appropriate given a recent
trend, at least in Congress, toward altering the existing regulatory regime with new legislative
reforms. A few bills proposed in the summer of 2015 include: Smarter Regulations Through
Advance Planning and Review Act of 2015, S. 1817, 11 4 th Cong. (2015) (which would require
agencies to develop plans for retrospective review of new rules); Early Participation in Regulations
Act of 2015, S. 1820, 11 4 th Cong. (2015) (which would require agencies to alert the public
ninety days before publishing most draft rules); and Principled Rulemaking Act of 2015, S. 1818,
114th Cong. (2015) (which would require agencies to consider alternatives to rulemaking and
to tailor their rules to decrease concomitant burdens on society). Of course, our proposal is
different from these bills, in the sense that we are less concerned with the socioeconomic burden
of regulation and more concerned with correcting the democracy deficit and the human-rights
abuses that may occur through agency contracting initiatives. But the proposal to increase public
awareness of rulemaking is analogous to our call for greater public participation in
privatization-and, more broadly, these and similar pieces of proposed legislation suggest that
there may be an appetite in Washington D.C. (perhaps in some state capitals as well) to rethink
some of our contemporary approaches to administrative governance.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
244. See supra text accompanying note 134.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 8g-go.
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By inviting the public into the outsourcing process, by establishing firm
contractual baselines, and by ensuring that liability will attach where
contractors breach, we can begin to reorient without unduly undermining the
flexibility that contracts can provide.
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